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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: O'CONNOR'S TEXTUAL 
MOVEMENT AND MYSTICISM 
Reading must always aim at a certain relationship, 
unperceived by the writer, between what he 
commands and what he does not command of the 
patterns of the language that he uses. This 
relationship is not a certain quantitative 
distribution of shadow and light, of weakness and 
force, but a signifying structure that critical 
reading should produce. 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (158) 
In a letter to "A" dated 20 July 55, 1 Flannery O'Connor 
noted that ''I write the way I do because (not though) I am a 
Catholic. This is a fact and nothing covers it like a bald 
statement. However, I am a Catholic peculiarly possessed of 
the modern consciousness, that thing Jung describes as 
unhistorical, solitary, and guilty ... [because ours] is a 
generation of wingless chickens which I suppose is what 
Nietzsche meant when he said God was dead" (HB 90). In this 
statement, O'Connor provides probably the best description 
of herself as a writer--a staunch believer with a modern 
mind. Most of her critics do not seem to possess such an 
understanding of this Southern writer. So far, many 
O'Connor scholars have confined their study to theological 
concerns, overlooking the other side of her, "the modern 
consciousness" that she possesses as shown in part by her 
1 
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familiarity with such modern thinkers as Jung and Nietzsche, 
among others. Although some critics, such as Frederick 
Asals and Suzanne Morrow Paulson, explored O'connor's work 
in terms of modern psychology, they treated her as they 
would any other modern writer, failing to address her 
peculiarity--''a Catholic peculiarly possessed of modern 
consciousness." 
Hence, O'Connor scholarship as a whole boasts few 
studies that have examined the writer's uniqueness, a 
quality resulting, I believe, from the tension and the play 
(or conflict) between her catholic outlook and her modern 
consciousness, and between her two simultaneous roles as a 
traditional believer and a modern fiction writer. It is 
this tension and play that make O'Connor's writing unusually 
rich and profound but, at the same time, as many critics 
have pointed out, extremely difficult and sometimes self 
contradictory. 2 Red R. Spivey, and Robert H. Brinkmeyer are 
among the few who have either examined or mentioned such 
tension and play in O'Connor. Based on his personal 
interactions with O'Connor, Spivey manages to show the 
paradoxical sides, "the deconstructive and the traditional 
sides of Flannery O'Connor," and advocates a deconstructive 
reading of her work: "Because of the paradoxes of O'Connor's 
fictional vision, a deconstructionist view of her work is 
inevitable" (275). Brinkmeyer, on the other hand, applies 
Bakhtin's theory of dialogism to O'Connor's writing and 
argues that O'Connor's fiction is the product of the 
interplay between O'Connor's fundamentalist self and the 
non-fundamentalist "other" which resides both in and out of 
herself, or between her traditional beliefs and her modern 
consciousness. 
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Spivey's argument for a deconstructive reading of 
O'Connor is very appropriate and timely, but his essay 
amounts to no more than a call for such a reading with 
little exploration of O'Connor's work. More important, like 
a few other O'Connor scholars, he merely exposes O'Connor's 
contradictory attitudes and views without examining why and 
how she possesses this paradoxical vision, a crucial 
question deconstructionists would and should ask in order to 
uncover the pattern of thinking and the movement of text we 
human beings perhaps can never escape. As for Brinkmeyer's 
study, while I hail his insight in perceiving the multiple 
vision in O'Connor, I disagree with his assumption that 
O'Connor intentionally sets up in her fiction the battle 
between these different perspectives. The vying 
perspectives, I would argue, are perhaps the inevitable 
result of the tension inherent in O'Connor herself. 
Furthermore, while Brinkmeyer examines the tension in 
O'Connor by focusing on the rivaling voices (those of the 
narrator, of the characters, and of O'Connor herself) in her 
fiction, I would like to approach the issue by exploring her 
work mostly in terms of signification. As a traditional 
believer, O'Connor sees the world with a sacramental vision 
and would like others to do so, but as a writer of modern 
consciousness, she is keenly aware of the difficulties of 
getting her messages across to her audience because of, 
among other things, problems of signification and the 
collapse of traditional values and beliefs. 
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Raised in a Catholic family in the South, O'Connor 
developed a strong sacramental vision which shaped both her 
life and her writing. In a speech delivered at Notre Dame, 
she preaches, "The Catholic sacramental view of life is one 
that sustains and supports at every turn the vision that the 
storyteller must have if he is going to write fiction of any 
depth" (MM 152). Moreover, O'Connor considers those who 
challenge the Eucharist responsible for the "dissolution of 
belief": "when Emerson decided, in 1832, that he could no 
longer celebrate the Lord's Supper unless the bread and wine 
were removed, an important step in the vaporization of 
religion was taken, and the spirit of that step has 
continued apace. When the physical fact is separate from 
the spiritual reality, the dissolution of belief is 
eventually inevitable" {MM 161-62). Yet O'Connor's 
sacramental vision is a unique (mystic) one, characterized 
by the thinking of modern French Jesuit thinker Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, whose work she read widely and in whom 
she developed a great interest. 3 
To Teilhard, the sacrament, like the Cross, is neither 
just a symbol nor merely reality. It is simultaneously 
both. This dialectical vision is an extension of his 
dialectical view of matter in general. Teilhard believes 
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that "matter falls into two distinct zones . . . the zone of 
matter in the material and carnal sense; and . the zone 
of matter taken in the spiritual sense" (Divine Milieu 108). 
The main thrust of his thought involves an attempt to break 
away from traditional bifurcate way of thinking where things 
are divided into spirit and matter or soul and body, with 
the former always privileged and the latter forever 
condemned. He writes: "In their struggle towards the 
mystical life, men have succumbed to the illusion of crudely 
contrasting soul and body, spirit and flesh, as good and 
evil" (Divine Milieu 105). Opposing such an illusion, he 
argues vigorously in works such as Divine Milieu and The 
Heart of Matter that matter itself is at once spiritual and 
material, and good and evil, since it may lead us either 
way. More important, he contends that it is only through 
matter that men can approach spirit--their God: "the soul 
can only rejoin God after having traversed a specific path 
through matter--which path can be seen as the distance which 
separates, but it can also be seen as the road that links" 
(Divine Milieu 108; emphasis original). Teilhard expresses 
his strongest belief in the inseparability of matter and 
spirit when he claims, "The truth is that even at the peak 
of my spiritual trajectory I was never to feel at home 
unless immersed in an Ocean of Matter . . " (Heart of 
Matter 20). 
Interestingly, Teilhard's criticism of the dichotomy of 
soul and body in human thinking anticipates Jacques 
Derrida's major attack on the Western metaphysics, though 
the two French thinkers probably share little else in their 
beliefs. To Derrida, as Barbara Johnson summarizes in her 
"Translator's Introduction" to his Dissemination, 
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Western thought. . . has always been structured in 
terms of dichotomies or polarities: good vs. evil, 
being vs. nothingness, presence vs. absence, truth 
vs. error, identity vs. difference, mind vs. 
matter, man vs. woman, soul vs. body, life vs. 
death, nature vs. culture, speech vs. writing. 
These polar opposites do not, however, stand as 
independent and equal entities. The second term 
in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, 
undesirable version of the first, a fall away from 
it. (viii) 
As a deconstructionist, Derrida, however, also sees the 
impossibility of escaping such a dichotomous pattern of 
thinking. Teilhard, on the other hand, does not. He tries 
to do away with it. But while exposing people's illusion of 
clearly dividing spirit and matter, he falls right back into 
the very thing from which he tries to flee. In collapsing 
the gap between matter and spirit, he opens up one within 
matter itself by splitting matter into, as quoted above, 
"two distinct zones": "the zone of matter in the material 
and carnal sense," and "the zone of matter taken in the 
spiritual sense." Moreover, in rejecting the identification 
of spirit as good and matter as evil, he merely transfers 
such an identification into matter itself, dividing matter 
into "Living Matter" which is "spiritualizable," and "Dead 
Matter or Inverse matter" which is "evil .•. at the 
opposite extreme of God" (Heart of Matter 230-233). 
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Such a paradoxical or, in a sense, mystical movement of 
text by Teilhard delineates not only the foundations of his 
theory but also, on a higher level, the grammar of Western 
thought in which we are perhaps forever trapped. That is, 
we all, including the greatest thinkers, follow such a 
grammar. A look at Phaedrus will illustrate the point. In 
Phaedrus, Plato, as Derrida demonstrates clearly, denounces 
writing as a poison corrupting human memory and truth, but 
later in his discussion he has to bring writing back as the 
only cure for corrupted memory and the only means for 
reaching presence and truth. Therefore, Plato's elimination 
of writing, Derrida argues, "must call upon the very thing 
it is expelling, the very surplus it is putting out. The 
pharmaceutical operation must therefore exclude itself from 
itself" (Dissemination 128; emphasis original). In his 
critique of a several well-known writers' work, Paul de Man 
also points out the impossibility of escaping this 
paradoxical movement in our writing: 
The discourse by which the figural structure of 
self is asserted fails to escape from the 
categories it claims to deconstruct, and this 
remains true, of course, of any discourse which 
pretends to reinscribe in its turn the figure of 
this aporia. There can be no escape from the 
dialectical movement of text. (187) 
O'Connor, of course, is no exception. Whole-heartedly 
embracing Teilhard's thought, she echoes the Jesuit in 
denouncing those who try to dichotomize spirit and matter: 
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"The Manichean separated spirit and matter. To them all 
material things were evil. They sought pure spirit and 
tried to approach the infinite directly without any 
mediation of matter" (MM 68). In this statement, O'Connor 
shows her understanding that, without the mediation of 
matter--in a narrower sense, without language or the 
signifier--reaching the infinite spirit, the signified, is 
out of the question, and her mission as a Catholic writer is 
impossible. For immediately following this comment, she 
says that, as a result of people's desire to eliminate the 
mediation of matter, "fiction is hard if not impossible 
because fiction is so very much an incarnational art" (MM 
68). O'Connor fully endorses Te,ilhard because the French 
thinker's dialectic view of matter not only expresses her 
thought but, more important, also enables her to remain at 
once a staunch believer and a modern fiction writer. A 
sacramental believer, as she claims herself to be, O'Connor 
would like to see matter (the signifier) and spirit (the 
signified) merge so that abstract religious ideas can be 
easily incarnated. But as a modern writer, she is not only 
aware but also in need of the gap between the signifier and 
the signified, for it is this gap that provides the writer 
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with a playing space, a space without which the writer could 
not function. A look at some of O'Connor's critical and 
personal writing will reveal clearly the paradoxical 
attitude and vision she possesses. 
On the one hand, O'Connor sees the Sacrament as 
reality, rather than just a symbol of God's grace. An 
incident she described in a letter to "A" best illustrates 
her religious vision. At a dinner party she attended, a 
lady called Broadwater observed that as an adult she no 
longer saw the Eucharist the way she did as a child, and she 
now "thought of it as a symbol and implied that it was a 
pretty good one." Hearing this, O'Connor flared up: "I then 
said in a very shaky voice, 'well, if it's a symbol, to hell 
with it.'" O'Connor goes on to say in the letter, "That was 
all the defense I was capable of but I realize now that this 
is all I will ever be able to say about it, outside of a 
story, except that it is the center of existence for me; all 
the rest of life is expendable" (HB 125). Her urge to 
defend the sacrament as reality rather than merely a symbol 
demonstrates her firm religious belief, but on another 
level, her defense hides a desire to merge the signified 
with the signifier. O'Connor admires the same desire in 
Teilhard: in her review of a book on Teilhard, she writes, 
"The discovery we owe to Teilhard is that vocation of spirit 
is visible, concrete ... " (PG 127). When spirit is visible 
and concrete, it becomes, by implication, visible matter 
itself, leaving no mediation between the two. Any religious 
meanings (messages) would then be self-evident, since the 
message and the messenger are fused. 
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As a fiction writer committed to a Catholic mission but 
equipped with modern consciousness, O'Connor, however, needs 
a space between matter and spirit to work with. She is 
again thankful to Teilhard, this time for opening up a gap 
within matter while closing the one traditionally posited 
between spirit and matter, a movement of text that makes 
writing possible. In her review of Teilhard's The 
Phenomenon of Man, O'Connor expresses, as an artist, her 
deep appreciation of the French thinker on this point: "the 
poet, whose sight is essentially prophetic, will at once 
recognize in Teilhard a kindred intelligence. His is a 
scientific expression of what the poet attempts to do: 
penetrate matter until spirit is revealed in it" (PG, 130; 
emphasis added). The last phrase best exemplifies both the 
French scholar's and O'Connor's dialectical movement of 
text. on the one hand, spirit is united with matter as the 
former is said to be in the latter, but, on the other hand, 
the metaphor "penetrate" entails that the two are not the 
same, for matter needs to be done away with in order for 
spirit to surface. "Penetration" thus involves a 
differentiation between the two. Such penetration is, as 
O'Connor claims in the quote, "what the poet attempts to 
do," namely, what the poet's responsibility is. 
In a lecture at Sweetbriar College, Virginia, O'Connor 
more explicitly defines this task of the artist: 
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The artist penetrates the concrete world in order 
to find at its depths the image of its source, the 
image of ultimate reality .... the real 
novelist, the one with an instinct for what he is 
about, knows that he cannot approach the infinite 
directly, that he must penetrate the natural human 
world as it is. The more sacramental his 
theology, the more encouragement he will get from 
it to do just that. (MM 163; emphasis added) 
The repeated use of the word "penetrate" reveals the 
prominent role of this metaphor in O'Connor's play of words, 
a play that enables her to be both a believer and a modern 
fiction writer. The last sentence in the quote above 
consummates such a play. The sacramental believer and the 
fiction writer, as we have shown, do not find themselves in 
harmony on the issue of signification. But in O'Connor's 
statement, the two are said to be in no conflict at all. 
Rather, the sacramental vision has become a necessary 
complement to the artist: the more sacramental his vision, 
the deeper the artist will penetrate matter to attain 
spirit--the "infinite" and "ultimate reality"--to use 
O'Connor's own words. 
Such play, found frequently in O'Connor's critical 
writing, does not eliminate but merely serves to hide the 
tension between her two roles, a tension that O'Connor seems 
constantly aware of. For example, in her essay "Catholic 
Novelists and Their Readers," O'Connor complains that "the 
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Catholic novelist frequently becomes so entranced with his 
Christian state that he forgets his nature as a fiction 
writer. This is all right, this is fine, if he stops 
writing fiction •.. " (MM 170). Although, in the previous 
paragraph, O'Connor also argues that the novelist's 
religious belief should make him or her a better novelist, 
the tension between belief and fiction writing is so real 
and, sometimes, so intense that she has to confront it; and 
she admits it overtly later in the essay: "· .. the 
novelist who is a Catholic may feel some friction between 
what he is supposed to do as a novelist and what is supposed 
to do as a Catholic ... " (MM, 177). Her awareness of the 
distinction between fiction writing and purely religious 
discourse is also evident in her narration of the incident 
at the dinner party where she had a confrontation with 
Broadwater. Concerning her rebuttal to Broadwater's comment 
defining the Eucharist as a symbol, O'Connor writes in the 
letter that "this is all I will ever be able to say about 
it, outside of a story ... " (HB 125; emphasis added). The 
phrase "outside of a story" indicates that, in a similar 
situation in a story, she probably would not say the same 
thing in the same manner. Instead, as a fiction writer, she 
would very likely express her ideas in a much more indirect 
way because, as she says, "the modern novelist sinks, or 
hides, his theme" rather than overtly expressing it (MM 72). 
The idea of "hiding" her theme in language again reveals 
O'Connor's desire for mediation between language and 
13 
meaning, for meaning here becomes an entity of its own that 
you can hide in a text. 
What O'Connor seems to ignore or perhaps is unaware of 
here is that when we open up a space between the signifier 
and the signified (a space or a differgnce, to use Derrida's 
term, that makes our thought possible), there is no 
guarantee we can trace from the signifier to the signified. 
As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak explains in her reading of 
Derrida, 
the sign, phonic as well as graphic, is a 
structure of difference . [and) what makes the 
possibility of thought is not merely the question 
of being, but also the never-annulled difference 
from "the completely other." such as the strange 
"being" of the sign: half of it always "not there" 
and the other half always "not that." The 
structure of the sign is determined by the trace 
or track of that other which is forever absent. 
This other is of course never to be founded in its 
full meaning. (xvii) 
In slightly more plain terms, Johnson also expounds this 
paradoxical nature of language and meaning: 
The very fact that a word is divided into a phonic 
signifier and a mental signified, and that as 
saussure pointed out, language is a system of 
differences rather than a collection of 
independently meaningful units, indicated that 
14 
language as such is already constituted by the 
very distances and differences it seeks to 
overcome. To mean, in other words, is 
automatically not to be. As soon as there is 
meaning, there is difference. Derrida's word for 
this lag inherent in any signifying act is 
differance, from the French verb differer, which 
means both to "differ" and to "defer." What 
Derrida attempts to demonstrate is that this 
differance inhabits the very core of what appears 
to be immediate and present. (ix) 
The theme that O'Connor says modern novelists hide in their 
fiction may, thus, never be recovered by the reader. 
Added to this almost impossible tracing of the meaning 
of writing is O'Connor's realization of the difficulty of 
conveying her religious messages due to the absence of 
sacramental vision in modern consciousness. According to 
Brinkmeyer, the challenge to sacramental vision that began 
with the Renaissance totally changed people's view of the 
world. 4 The crumbling of sacramental vision brought about, 
as Erich Heller points out, "a radical change in man's idea 
of reality, in that complex fabric of unconsciously held 
convictions about what is real and what is not"; and with 
this change is gone "that unity of word and deed, of picture 
and thing, of the bread and the glorified body. Body will 
be merely body, and symbol merely symbol" (267, 212). In 
other words, the loss of sacramental vision completely 
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transformed human consciousness. By the time of the 
Enlightenment, according to Lewis P. Simpson, the rational 
mind had replaced revelation as the model of truth, and with 
such valorization of reason, people turned drastically 
inward and placed all value and meaning within 
consciousness. As a result, the human mind, writes Simpson, 
believes "solely in its own existence" and "has no knowledge 
outside itself and no reference for action outside its own 
functioning" (27) . 
This isolation of the self in its own subjectivity has 
reached its apex in the twentieth century. The result of 
this radical subjectification of reality, as J. Hillis 
Miller describes, is the death of God: 
Man has killed God by separating his subjectivity 
from everything but itself. The ego has put 
everything in doubt, and has defined all outside 
itself as the object of its thinking power. 
Cogito ergo sum: the absolute certainty about the 
self reached by Descartes' hyperbolic doubt leads 
to the assumption that things exist, for me at 
least, only because I think them. When everything 
exists only as reflected in the ego, then man has 
drunk up the sea. If man is defined as subject, 
everything else turns into object. This includes 
God, who now becomes merely the highest object of 
man's knowledge. God, once the creative sun, the 
power establishing the horizon where heaven and 
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earth come together, becomes an object of thought 
like any other. When man drinks up the sea, he 
also drinks up God, the creator of the sea. In 
this way man is the murderer of God. (3) 
O'Connor knows well the modern world Miller describes and 
the challenge she is facing in writing in such a world. 
Soon after the letter to "A" in which she cited Nietzsche in 
describing our age as one where "God was dead" (see the 
quote that starts this chapter), O'Connor wrote to "A" 
again: 
. I find myself in a world where everybody has 
his compartment, puts you in yours, shuts the door 
and departs. One of the awful things about 
writing when you are a Christian is that for you 
the ultimate reality is the Incarnation, the 
present reality is the Incarnation, and nobody 
believes in the Incarnation . (HB 92) 
The impact of the changes in the modern world on O'Connor is 
tremendous, for she witnessed in her life the collapse of 
traditional culture in the South. Her response to the 
disintegration of Southern culture is again, as is typical 
of her, ambivalent: one side of her, as Spivey points out, 
"clung to the stability of a declining social order. . . . 
but another side of her psyche fully accepted the growing 
cultural disorganization of the modern South" (276). 
O'Connor deplores the modern lack of faith caused by 
the disappearance of sacramental vision--the collapse of 
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unity between word and meaning, between body and spirit. 
She regrets the crumbling of established logocentric beliefs 
and values; she expresses this regret when she writes, "We 
are now living in an age which doubts both fact and value . 
. In our fractured culture, we cannot agree on morals; 
we cannot even agree that moral matters should come before 
literary ones when there is a conflict between them" (MM 
117, 140). In these words, one will not fail to feel 
O'Connor's yearning for a stable logocentric value system. 
But, on the other hand, O'Connor also embraces, though 
perhaps unconsciously, new ideas and outlooks that the 
cultural changes have brought about, and that call into 
question the values and beliefs the other side of her 
attempts to uphold. Spivey pinpoints this unique nature of 
O'Connor's work when he contends that, 
O'Connor [in her fiction] was seeking quite 
unconsciously most of the time, to decompose her 
own view of the world, if not her style, in order 
to exorcise from her mind a logocentrism that 
governed many aspects of her life and work. These 
unconscious efforts sprang in part from her 
perception of profound changes in American 
culture. (278) 
As a result of this dialectical vision, O'Connor, on the one 
hand, advocates "incarnational fiction," arguing that 
fiction "should reinforce our sense of the supernatural by 
grounding it in concrete, observable reality" (MM 148) . The 
metaphor of "grounding" spirit in concrete, observable 
matter reveals again her wish for unity between the 
signified and the signifier--a wish for transcendental 
meaning to be incarnated in her fiction. 
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Yet O'Connor simultaneously attacks people's obsessive 
desire to pin down the meaning of text, that is, their 
desire to locate an unequivocal transcendental signified 
often equated with ultimate truth: 
they [people who are reading a story or a novel] 
approach it as if it were a problem in algebra. 
Find x. And when they do find or think they find 
this abstraction, x, then they go off with an 
elaborate sense of satisfaction and the notion 
that they have "understood" the story. Many 
students confuse the process of understanding a 
thing with understanding it ••.. in a good 
novel, more always happens than we are able to 
take in at once, more happens than meets the eye. 
The mind is led by what it sees into the greater 
depths that the book's symbols naturally suggest. 
This is what is meant when critics say that a 
novel operates on several levels. The truer the 
symbol, the deeper it leads you, the more meaning 
it opens up. (MM 71-72) 
To O'Connor, the process of understanding a story is an 
endless on-going experience, and there is no such a thing as 
the meaning of a story. She continues, 
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People have a habit of saying, "What is the 
theme of your story?" and they expect you to give 
them a statement: "The theme of my story is the 
economic pressure of the machine on the middle 
class"--or some such absurdity .•.. 
Some people have the notion that you read the 
story and then climb out of it into the meaning, 
but for the fiction writer himself the whole story 
is the meaning, because it is an experience, not 
an abstraction. (MM 73) 
But even the author, O'Connor argues; has little control of 
the meaning of hisjher work: "Actually, a work of art exists 
without its author from the moment the words are on paper, 
and the more complete the work, the less important it is who 
wrote it or why" (MM 126). Of course, O'Connor's position 
on the issue of authors' intentions, like her position on 
many other things, is by no means consistent. In fact, she 
was very concerned with whether or not people understood her 
intentions in fiction. 5 
The result of O'Connor's dialectical view of writing is 
her unique fiction, which registers simultaneously an 
effort, conscious or unconscious, to deconstruct the various 
logocentric beliefs rooted in Southern culture and a drive 
for an "incarnational art" which she hopes would uphold the 
traditional religious beliefs she values. On the one hand, 
we see her fiction attacking and satirizing, among other 
things, the notion of absolute truth/reality and the 
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illusion of a transcendental meaning, but, on the other 
hand, we also observe the same fiction sometimes affirming 
(often at the end of the stories) the belief in an ultimate 
truth manifested in Godjreligion, a belief revealing the 
author's urge for the transcendental signified. What 
enables her to have it both ways appears, again, to be the 
mysticism she developed from reading thinkers like Teilhard, 
for, very often, her characters (such as Haze in Wise Blood 
and young Tarwater in Violent Bear It Away), no matter how 
stubbornly they refuse to believe, are mysteriously 
converted at the end of the stories, although, most of the 
time, such conversions seem forced without sufficient 
textual support. Yet, despite this frequent awkward final 
assertion of a traditional religious vision, O'Connor's 
fiction remains a powerful deconstruction of logocentrism. 
In the following chapters, I will elaborate and support 
my argument by approaching O'Connor's fiction mostly in 
terms of signification, with each chapter except the last 
devoted to a specific logocentric belief that o•connorjher 
work deconstructs. Chapter II, a reading of Wise Blood, 
focuses on the issue of truth and reality, i.e., on how 
truth/reality is merely man-made fiction. Chapter III, a 
study of stories that deal with people's futile urge to fuse 
the signifier and the signified, exposes the danger of 
logocentric hermeneutics. Chapter IV, an examination of 
stories that are concerned with the issue of identity, aims 
to illustrate the absence of clear-cut identities that 
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people desire to possess. Chapter V, a scrutiny of stories 
that deal with people's total dependence on language, 
exhibits language as a game people play to substitute the 
word for the world. Chapter VI, a reading of The Violent 
Bear It Away, differs from chapters II to V in that it does 
not focus on one issue; it rather shows how all the issues 
treated in the rest of O'Connor's work find an expression in 
this novel, making it O'Connor's masterpiece. As expected, 
I will also try in the discussion to demonstrate that 
O'Connor, while attacking these various logocentric ideas, 
falls, sometimes, into the very trap she denounces others 
for falling into, i.e., asserting an ultimate truth. 
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Notes 
1. "A" is a young woman who, according to Sally 
Fitzgerald (editor of HB), had "a nine-year friendship and 
correspondence" with O'Connor and who gave Fitzgerald copies 
of all the letters she possessed but "wishes to remain 
completely anonymous" (HB 89-90). 
2. Though quite a few critics have discussed the 
difficulties and contradictions in O'Connor's work, many of 
them, without a keen awareness of the tension between the 
two sides of O'Connor, reduce the contradictions in her 
writing to the issue of how well she realized her religious 
intention. Robert E. Golden and Mary c. Sullivan (5-6), 
John R. May, and Marshall Bruce Gentry (3-4), for example, 
in their respective studies all argue that, to use Gentry's 
words, "the foremost issue in O'Connor's criticism [is] •the 
relation between O'Connor's stated religious intent and the 
realization of that intent within the fiction'" (3). 
3. O'Connor exhibited her reading of and interest in 
Teilhard in many of her letters, book reviews, and speeches. 
See for example HB pp. 361, 387-8, 477, 509, and PG pp. 86-
88, 99, 107-8, 126-27, 129-30. O'Connor recommended 
Teilhard to several of her friends. Even the title of her 
famous story "Everything that Rises Must Converge" comes 
from, as she claims, "a physical proposition" that she found 
in Teilhard (HB 438). 
4. The following material and discussion of the impact 
of the disappearance of sacramental vision are based on 
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Brinkmeyer (2-5). 
5. See for example her complaint about critics' 
misunderstanding of The Violent Bear It Away in her letters 
to "A," to Robert Lowell, and to Andrew Lytle, written 
respectively in January and February, 1960 (HB 372-73); and 
her appreciation of Spivey for understanding her intention. 
In her letter to Spivey, O'Connor wrote, "You have certainly 
got my intention down in this story ["The Lame Shall Enter 
First"]. I'm not sure of myself that I carried out the 
intention dramatically so well .... I do thank you for 
writing this [article]. It's a great help to me to know 
that somebody understands what I am after [sic] doing" (HB 
506-7). 
CHAPTER II 
WISE BLOOD: TRUTH/REALITY AS FICTION 
Wise Blood, O'Connor's first published book, has so far 
been treated almost exclusively as a purely religious tale, 
"a modern saint legend" in Dorothy Walter's words (43), or a 
tale "about a modern pilgrim" in Jill P. Baumgaertner•s 
interpretation (121). Reading the book in deconstructionist 
terms will, I believe, broaden our understanding of it. To 
approach the book this way, we will need a solid grasp on 
deconstruction. Noted for its persistent attack on Western 
metaphysics, deconstruction has been viewed mostly as a 
force against tradition. Few, hence, seem to have noticed 
its debt to one of the important sources of Western 
tradition, the Bible, a debt Herbert Schneidau convincingly 
demonstrates in his study Sacred Discontent: The Bible and 
Western Tradition. Schneidau explains the Bible's heritage 
as follows: 
The Bible's •influence' is not to give us genres 
or archetypes which can be endlessly refilled with 
extraneous materials; instead it plays a role 
which demands that we acknowledge how precarious 
is our grasp of any meaning in the world at all 
and that we force ourselves to probe the words and 
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forms before us in a never-ending labor. (255) 
Schneidau further suggests that deconstruction fully 
inherits this unique role of the Bible; that is, like the 
Bible, deconstruction challenges our certainty about any 
"truth" or "meaning" in the world. G. Douglas Atkins 
provides a clear summary of Schneidau's argument in his 
discussion of deconstruction: 
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Derridean deconstruction, according to Schneidau, 
is akin to the way in which the Bible insists on 
the fictionality of things, alienating us from the 
world, which it empties of 'meaning,' reminding us 
constantly of the vanity of human wishes. Yet the 
Bible's attitude is always ambivalent, at once 
criticizing and nourishing culture. (31) 
A similar ambivalence, to recall the discussion in the last 
chapter, marks O'Connor's world outlook, making her 
simultaneously a deconstructionist and a safeguard of 
Southern culture. And it is in Schneidau's sense of 
deconstruction that O'Connor's fiction, Wise Blood in 
particular, qualifies best as deconstructionist oeuvre. 
Published in 1952, Wise Blood has been considered a 
difficult and controversial book. To some critics, the book 
is flawed by O'Connor's overly harsh religious vision; to 
others, the novel, especially its central tale of Haze 
Motes, is extremely "queer. 111 But read in Schneidau's 
deconstructionist terms, the novel makes good sense: Haze's 
obsessive but failed pursuit of meaning in the world 
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functions as a powerful deconstruction of the logocentric 
beliefs people complacently cherish, and Haze's life story 
provides a thorough exposure of the meaninglessness and 
fictionality of the world that we human beings create. To 
suppport my argument, I will examine the novel from a 
structuralist and post-structuralist perspective, exploring 
the problem of truth and meaning in terms of signification. 
The issue of signification is highlighted from the 
beginning of the novel. When the story opens, Haze Motes is 
on a train to Taulkinham. He meets Mrs. Wally Bee 
Hitchcock, who sits facing him in the same car. The 
narrator describes in great detail how Mrs. Hitchcock tries 
to find out who Haze is and where he is going. After asking 
him whether he is going home and receiving no answer, Mrs. 
Hitchcock begins to scrutinize Haze. The thing that catches 
her special attention, we are told, is Haze's newly-bought 
"glaring blue suit" with its price tag still on. Eager to 
find out its price, she "squinted at the price tag. The 
suit had cost him $11.98. She felt that that placed him and 
looked at his face again as if she were fortified against it 
now" {CW 3). This incident is of great importance. Mrs. 
Hitchcock is so interested in Haze's suit and its price 
because the suit and its price are both meaningful signs in 
the society in which they live. A suit in the Western world 
is usually a sign that distinguishes professionals from blue 
collar workers; the price of a garment is a tag ("price tag" 
as we always call it) which registers and signifies one's 
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social and economic status, as is shown in the case of the 
Haze's suit and its price. In buying the suit, Haze wants 
people to recognize him as a professional, but its cheap 
price betrays his low status: the $11.98 price, as quoted 
above, "placed'' Haze, making Mrs. Hitchcock feel "fortified" 
against him in their interaction. 
Because the major concern of structuralists and post-
structuralists is what makes meaning possible, in this 
study, I am, however, less interested in the meanings of the 
suit and its price as signs than in what enables them to 
have these meanings. "Treating as signs objects or actions 
which have meaning within a culture," modern linguists, as 
Jonathan Culler points out, attempt "to identify the rules 
and conventions which, consciously or unconsciously 
assimilated by members of that culture, make possible 
meanings which the phenomena have" (31). In other words, to 
cite Culler again, "If we are to understand our social and 
cultural world, we must think not of independent objects but 
of symbolic structures, systems of relations which, by 
enabling objects and actions to have meaning, create a human 
universe" (25). These symbolic structures and systems of 
relations, as many structuralists have demonstrated, are 
ipso facto the products of mankind--of people of a given 
culture in a given historical period. For example, we all 
know that what makes the suit uniquely meaningful in the 
Western world is the underlying symbolic structures (rules 
and customs) which dictate how people should dress for 
various social occasions; these underlying structures and 
systems may change from community to community and from 
generation to generation. 
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But what determine these structures (systems) and their 
changes are ironically the very people who are governed by 
them. Claude Levis-Strauss pinpoints this paradoxical nature 
of mankind when he writes, "men have made themselves to no 
less an extent than they have made the races of their 
domestic animals, the only difference being that the process 
has been less conscious or voluntary" (353}. We have made 
ourselves because, while we create our symbolic structures, 
which in turn allow signs to have meanings, we subject 
ourselves to these meanings, assuming they are objectively 
based on truth and reality. We are often unaware that, to 
use Terence Hawkes's words, "meanings arises from the 
interplay of signs . . . [and) the world we inhabit is not 
one of 'facts' but of signs about facts which we [human 
beings] encode and decode ceaselessly from system to system 
•.. " (122; emphasis original). The whole human world is 
hence what Derrida often calls a text. "According to 
Derrida," as Atkins summarizes, 
nothing escapes textuality: there is simply 
nothing outside textuality, outside 'the 
temporalization of a lived experience which is 
neither in the world nor in 'another world'. 
not more in time than in space, [in which] 
differences appear among the elements or rather 
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produce them, make them emerge as such and 
constitute the texts, the chains, and the systems 
of traces.• Derrida proposes, in fact, a 'double' 
science,• a science of textuality. Once we 
rethink the metaphysical concept of 'reality• in 
'textual' terms (there are no philosophical 
regulations of truth, the thing itself being a 
sign and all 'facts' being in 'fact• 
interpretations, as Nietzsche argued), we are 
left with a world of texts, all of which possess a 
certain 'fictive' or 'literary' quality. (23; 
emphasis and parenthesis original) 
The world Haze Motes enters at the opening of Wide Blood is 
thus also a text, a text framed completely by a system of 
monetary relations and embodied entirely by the symbolic 
structures of commercialism, as is demonstrated in part by 
Mrs. Hitchcock's readingjtreatment of Haze. 
Haze himself does not realize the fictionality of the 
world at all as he sits in the train to Taulkinham. On the 
contrary, he seems determined to challenge Christianity for 
being unreal and to embrace what he mistakes for the natural 
world represented by Taulkinham, a decision he has made 
after being released from the army and after finding, upon 
returning to his hometown Eastrod, his childhood home, a 
source of his comfort and faith, completely gone. These 
latter two events had a great impact on Motes, especially on 
his religious vision. Influenced by his Grandfather, a 
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preacher, and his pious mother, Haze had developed from 
childhood a keen interest in religion. When he joined the 
army, "[t]he only things from Eastrod he took into the army 
with him were a black Bible and a pair of silver-rimmed 
spectacles that had belonged to his mother" (CW 12). During 
his four years in the army, Haze's interest in the Bible 
began, however, to diminish, and he developed doubt about 
God and sin, thanks probably to his fellow servicemen's 
atheist inculcation. When he first entered the army, he 
still read the Bible, but by the time he leaves the army, he 
reads it no more: "he did not read any book now but he kept 
the Bible because it had come from home" (CW 13). Home is 
then his last hope and faith, since it is the only thing he 
says he is longing for during his final days in the army (CW 
12-13). So when he discovers his childhood home to be "only 
a shell" (CW 13), all his hope or faith evaporates. 
This discovery brings to a culmination Haze's doubt 
about the existence of God, and, in a larger sense, about 
all Biblical signification, for, like all those in the South 
who take a fundamentalist approach to scripture, he has 
always read the Bible in literal terms, looking for physical 
signs as necessary proof of its truth. At ten, after he had 
seen his father writhing in voyeuristic delight before a fat 
woman who squirmed in a black coffin in a carnival tent that 
was forbidden to children, Haze was beaten by his mother and 
made to feel a sinner. As a result, he had walked for a 
mile in the woods with stones in his shoes and then waited 
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for physical signs of God's forgiveness; however, he was 
totally disappointed: "Nothing happened. If a stone had 
fallen he would have taken it as a sign" (CW 30). This 
obsession with finding the observable signified--an 
obsession that derives from the presumption that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and the 
signified--leads Haze to the conclusion that Biblical 
stories are not real. 
Haze's attack on the believability of the Bible, which 
is, above all, metaphorical, is made clear early in the 
story and continued throughout most of the novel. During 
his meal in the dining car, Haze tells the lady across the 
table that he does not believe in Jesus: "Well, I wouldn't 
even if He existed. Even if He was on this train" (CW 7). 
What Haze wants to convey here is not just that he does not 
believe in Jesus, but also, and more important I believe, 
that God does not exist--an implied message highlighted by 
the two subjunctive "even if" clauses. Two chapters later, 
Haze makes his point completely explicit. When the fake-
blind "evangelist," Asa Hawkes, accuses him of having 
committed "fornication and blasphemy," Haze answers, "They 
ain't nothing but words," and "Nothing matters but that 
Jesus does not exist" (CW 29). His first-day preaching 
about the Church without Christ carries the same message. 
Haze challenges his audience again and again: "Where has the 
blood you think you been redeemed by touched?" And he 
continues, "I'm going to preach there was no Fall because 
there was nothing to fall from and no Redemption because 
there was no Fall and no Judgment because there wasn't the 
first two. Nothing matters but that Jesus was a liar" (CW 
58, 59) • 
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Haze's argument against Jesus and the Bible as a whole 
is that there is no physical evidence--no referents or 
objective signified--to back them up. According to Haze, 
any thing without a physical referent is meaningless: "it 
was not right to believe in anything you couldn't see or 
hold in your hands or test with your teeth" (CW 116). It is 
with the same mentality Haze later requests Hawkes provide 
physical proof of God's grace: "If Jesus cured blind men, 
howcome [sic] you don't get Him to cure you?" (CW 63). 
Haze's reasoning is flawed. As Derrida points out in 
discussing the relation between "meaning," "referent," and 
"signified," 
Certain statements can have a meaning, although 
without objective signification. "The circle is 
square" is a proposition invested with meaning. 
It has enough meaning for me to be able to judge 
it false or contradictory (widersinning and not 
sinnlos, says Husserl). I am placing this example 
under the category of the absence of the signified 
. . . [because] "square circle" marks the absence 
of a referent, certainly, and also the absence of 
a certain signified, but not the absence of 
meaning. (Margins of Philosophy 319) 
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Haze's obsession with locating the signified for the Word 
comes from his desire for a one-to-one correspondence 
between the signifier and the signified, or between language 
and reality. This obsession is based, to use Schneidau's 
words, on "an implicit presumption that we have an easily 
accessible standard of 'external reality' against which to 
measure any of our utterances" (248). Such a standard of 
"external reality" simply does not exist. 
Haze's urge to pin down the signifier against "external 
reality" is shared by other people in Taulkinham. For 
instance, when Haze is preaching about his new Jesus, Hoover 
Shoats, a radio evangelist, asks him to show Him to the 
audience; and as Haze fails to do so, Shoats claims, "That's 
the trouble with you innerleckchuls .... you don't never 
have nothing to show for what you are saying" (CW 90). 
Another example occurs towards the end of the story. When 
Haze finally abandons the realm of the natural world and is 
determined to embrace the literary kingdom of Christianity, 
he realizes the blasphemy and sin he has committed. He 
tells his landlady, Mrs. Flood, "I'm not clean," a statement 
that sparks the following significant, though also comic, 
conversation: 
"I know it," she said after a minute, "you got 
blood on that night shirt and on the bed. You 
ought to get a washwoman ... " 
"That's not the kind of clean," he said. 
"There's only one kind of clean, Mr. Motes," she 
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muttered. (CW 127). 
The dialogue is important because it centers on the issue of 
signification. For one thing, it makes clear the 
impossibility of a one-to-one relation between the signifier 
and the signified. For another, it shows us that, to Mrs. 
Flood, and probably to all the people of Taulkinham, there 
is perhaps indeed only one kind of clean, the physical one, 
because the "external reality" which they assume exists and 
against which they measure each other's utterances is merely 
the materialistic reality they have created in monetary 
terms. Mrs. Flood's interest in Haze is based on nothing 
but money--she is interested only in his fairly substantial 
retirement pension from the army. In other words, to her, 
Haze's meaning lies in the money he signifies. And money, 
of course, is but another signifier in the commercial 
system. 
What Haze and the people of Taulkinham are perhaps 
unaware of when they claim that God is unreal and that there 
exists only one reality is that, in making those claims, 
they are playing god, trying to impose their own meaning 
upon "things" and to replace Biblical "reality" with their 
own "reality"--their fictional world. This act of 
replacement, often unconscious to the human mind, is, in 
structuralist/post-structuralist terms, people's process of 
understanding, "a process of reducing one type of reality to 
another" (Culler, 30). Haze and the people of Taulkinham 
follow this process. In place of a religious world, they 
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have created a commercial universe, or, to be more accurate, 
they have turned the former into the latter, for, as I will 
show, they have literally made religion a money-making 
business. Religion can be easily transformed into business 
because the two are not only structurally similar but also 
closely related, if not totally interdependent, in reality: 
both the religious kingdom and the commercial world are 
artificial systems or realities we human beings have built 
to maintain a way of life. Although the two systems are 
supposed to be different and to create two entirely 
different ways of life, they are often intermingled in our 
world. To support my argument, we need only examine how 
most of the religious organizations, especially those of TV 
evangelists, operate in this country. Since all societies 
have always openly privileged the spiritual life and 
condemned the material one, though most of us perhaps 
covertly enjoy the latter, we frequently embrace the latter 
in the name of the former, as is shown by the people in 
Taulkinham where commercialism subsumes everything. 
When Haze first arrives in Taulkinham, what he sees 
upon stepping out of the train are business signs: "as soon 
as he stepped off the train, he began to see signs and 
lights. Peanuts, Western Union, Ajax, Taxi Hotel, Candy. 
Most of them were electric and moved up and down or blinked 
frantically" (CW 15) . The next thing he runs into is a 
hand-written advertisement in the men's toilet for Mrs. 
Leora Watts, a prostitute. Motes is immediately drawn into 
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this commercial symbolic structure, for he rushes at once to 
Mrs. Watt's, and more important, he speaks, consciously or 
unconsciously, its language. He tells Mrs. Watts, "I come 
for the usual business" (CW 18; emphasis added). Everything 
in this town is truly "business," including religion. What 
Haze encounters in Taulkinham the following night fully 
illustrates this point. He is loitering along the street 
downtown, and, before long, he finds himself in a crowd of 
people watching a salesman demonstrate his products, potato 
peelers. But the salesman is soon interrupted by the fake-
blind preacher Hawkes, who wants to cash in on the crowd. 
He speaks to them: "Help a blind preacher. If you won't 
repent, give up a nickel" (CW 21). What Hawkes does here is 
his routine. In fact, as we learn later, Hawkes has faked 
his blindness purposely for this religion/business. 
Hawkes is not the only one in the story who engages in 
this kind of religiousjbusiness practice. Shoats is another 
one. When Shoats first meets Haze, the latter is preaching 
about the Church Without Christ on his recently acquired 
Essex. Shoats immediately decides to impose himself upon 
Haze as a partner in order to turn it into a money-making 
enterprise. Despite Haze's denial, Shoats claims that he 
has been saved by Haze and is now a disciple of the new 
Church, but he mistakenly calls it the Holy Church of Christ 
without Christ. And, in spite of Haze's protest, Shoats 
goes on to ask the members of the audience to join the 
church by each paying him a dollar. To stop Shoats's 
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trickery, Haze finally has to use force. Shoats, however, 
will not give up. He resumes his money-making scheme by 
hiring Solace Layfield to follow and emulate Haze in 
preaching, a scheme which is ended only by Haze's killing of 
Layfield. 
Yet Haze does not stop Shoats and Layfield, really 
because he disagrees with their practice. He does it 
because he fears that they may be a threat to his authority 
as a god, a role he is creating for himself by inventing the 
Church Without Christ. Haze, as we already know, plunges 
into the life of Taulkinham as soon as he arrives in the 
city. He plays into its systems of monetary relations. 
Besides purchasing sex from Mrs. Watts, he approaches and 
then seduces Sabbath Hawkes, Asa Hawkes's daughter, by, 
among other things, buying her a potato peeler. Moreover, 
when he finds himself still the only member of his church 
after two nights of preaching, Haze tries, though in vain, 
to bribe a boy into joining his church by taking him to a 
whorehouse: "But it was all a mistake because after they had 
gone and got out [of the whorehouse] again and Haze had 
asked him to be a member of the Church without Christ, or 
more than that, a disciple, an apostle, the boy said he was 
sorry but he couldn't be a member ... " (CW 83). 
Another example of Haze's absorption into the worldly 
structures and systems of Taulkinham is his purchase of the 
Essex. A car is a very important sign of one's value and 
importance in an industrial and commercialized world. 
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Possessing a car would certainly add to one's worth in such 
a society. Haze understands this perfectly. He spends all 
of his fifty dollars on the Essex, and, more significant, 
when discussing with Hawkes and his daughter about 
justification for redemption, he claims: "Nobody with a good 
car needs to be justified" {CW 64). This statement, which 
seems out of place in a religious discussion, is not 
inappropriate for people to whom religion is commercial. 
The statement also reflects our worldly reality where a 
person with a good car is indeed often "justified" for 
better treatment than one with a poor car when other 
conditions hold constant. 
While participating in the creation of this worldly 
reality in Taulkinham, Haze, like the rest of the characters 
in the story, also invents his own private fictional world 
sustained only by his subjective belief. For example, his 
Essex is an old car that is falling apart. But Haze will 
not admit it; rather he repeatedly declares the car to be in 
excellent condition. After he takes his car to a mechanic 
who says that he cannot put the car in good order, Haze 
says, "This is a good car," and he takes it to another 
mechanic (CW 65). The second mechanic lies that he can fix 
the car overnight, and Haze believes him, leaving the car in 
his charge. However, to Haze's great dismay, not long after 
he picks up the car the next day, it breaks down on a dirt 
road off a highway. But even then, Haze still will not 
accept his car's real condition. He twice tells the gas 
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station owner who has come to his aid at his request that it 
is a good car, and he claims, "That car'll get me anywhere I 
want to go" (CW 71). Similarly, later when a mechanic at a 
gas station, after checking Haze's car, tells Haze all the 
problems the car has and warns him of the danger of driving 
it on highway, Haze flares up: "'Listen,' Haze said, 'this 
car is just beginning its life. A lightening bolt couldn't 
stop it'" (CW 116). 
What is most interesting here is Haze's complete trust 
in the mechanic who cheats him. As soon as Haze brings his 
car into his garage, this mechanic tells him that he can 
"put the car in best shape overnight, because it was such a 
good car to begin with, so well put together and with such 
good materials in it, and because, he added, he was the best 
mechanic in town." Haze, without asking any question, 
leaves the car with him, "certain that it was in honest 
hands" (CW 65). Haze believes him but not the other 
mechanics because this mechanic says what he wants to 
believe whereas the others do not. This incident shows two 
things. First, it exposes Haze's desire or need to believe, 
or, more precisely, to suspend disbelief, even though the 
desire or need is obviously displaced. Instead of searching 
for God, Haze seeks truth from these mechanics, so, on a 
metaphorical level, these mechanics are Haze's gods. 
Second, the incident reveals how Haze, and probably all of 
us, determine truth and reality--using what we like to hear 
to affirm our own sense of what is true and real. It also 
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reveals that "external reality" is often our own creation--
a projection of what we believe to be real. This is the 
logocentric self-confirming process by which we attempt to 
reach, first, "truth" and, then, power, as exemplarily 
manifested in Haze's story. 
All Haze's actions in the story may be characterized as 
striving for power in the name of searching for truth. He 
attacks Christ for having no physical proof as truth, but 
his own discourse, as shown above, is supported by nothing 
but his self-projected "reality." Similarly, Haze will not 
believe in Christ and His stories because, as he repeatedly 
claims, they are just words. But when he advocates his new 
Jesus and is asked to show Him, he admits, "There is no such 
a thing as any new Jesus. That ain't anything but a way to 
say something" (CW 90) . This statement reveals that Haze, 
while claiming truth, does the very thing he attacks others 
for doing. Haze thus epitomizes what we all often do in 
achieving "truth." When we claim that we are correct (or we 
know the "truth"), we always have to sbow that we are 
different from those whom we consider wrong, but while doing 
so, we almost always fall into the very thing we try to 
exclude or to define as the other. 2 We engage in this type 
of paradoxical practice in our drive for truth because if we 
can claim possession of truth, we then possess power and 
authority. The drive for truth thus always hides an urge 
for power and authority. This is because, as Danny J. 
Anderson, a scholar on deconstruction, points out, power and 
authority "always already are at work in discourse, 
attempting to smother difference" (151). Haze's discourse 
is no exception. 
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Haze's speech is noted by the reader for its claim on 
truth/power. In fact, Haze seldom speaks without mentioning 
the word "truth." Early in the story, trying to compete 
with Hawkes, he boasts to the audience: "Listenhere, I am a 
preacher myself and I preach the truth" (CW 30). Later he 
warns the people who show no interest in listening to his 
preaching that they would miss the truth if they left him: 
"Listen, you people, I'm going to take the truth with me 
wherever I go .... I'm going to preach it to whoever'!! 
listen at whatever place" (CW 59). Haze even labels himself 
as a person who does not "want nothing but the truth" (CW 
107). The speech that best exposes his urge for truth/power 
is the following: "I preach there are all kinds of truth, 
your truth and somebody else's, but behind all of them, 
there's only one truth and that is there's no truth .. 
No truth behind all truths is what I and this church 
preach!" (CW 93). Haze's drive for truth/power is too 
strong here to evade our notice. Hidden in his denial of 
any truth is a claim that only he knows the truth, the "only 
one truth" he preaches. But what makes possible as well as 
impossible such a claim of truth is the paradox inherent in 
the statement, in which two unreconcilable assertions 
cohabit but cancel each other out: the claim that "there's 
only one truth" negates the assertion that "there's no 
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truth," and vice versa. Claiming truth in such a manner 
exhibits clearly once again that what Haze desires is the 
ability to claim truth/power rather than truth itself. 
Haze's desire for truth/power is so intense that he 
would do anything to stop or eliminate anyone who might 
challenge his sole claim on it. Haze does not really 
dispute with Shoats and Layfield because the two are fake 
preachers. We know that, while Haze accuses Shoats of 
selling religion, he himself has attempted to enroll a boy 
as a member of his church by taking the boy to a whorehouse. 
Haze truly hates Shoats and Layfield because they challenge 
his truth/authority. We know that it is Shoats who corners 
Haze, making him admit that the new Jesus he advocates does 
not exist {CW 90-91). And it is Layfield who makes Haze see 
the side of himself that he failed to see before. The first 
time Haze becomes aware of the similarity between him and 
Layfield in what they are doing is when they are both 
preaching and a woman asks him, "Him [Layfield] and you 
twins?" {CW 94). The idea of equating Layfield with himself 
hurts Haze so much that, instead of answering the woman's 
question, he expresses his wish to have Layfield killed, 
making the woman totally confused: 
"If you don't hunt it (Layfield] down and kill 
it, it'll hunt you down and kill you," Haze 
answered. 
"Huh? Who?" she said. {CW 95) 
But despite his unwillingness to acknowledge their 
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similarity, Haze is forced to see Layfield as a double of 
himself when he confronts Layfield face to face: looking 
closely at Layfield, Haze "seemed to perceive the 
resemblance in their clothes and possibly their faces" (CW 
114). Haze is horrified by the notion that he is no 
different from Layfield, and will not accept it because the 
notion threatens his self-conceived identity as a truth 
possessor; consequently, he ruthlessly murders Layfield in 
order to preserve his god-like image. In murdering 
Layfield, Haze is trying to affirm his role of god: he is 
judging Layfield and determining his fate. Yet the murder 
cannot erase Haze's emerging consciousness that, despite his 
denial, he is indeed not much different from the two 
counterfeit preachers. "In seeing himself in Layfield, 
Haze," Brinkmeyer suggests, 
undergoes a profound experience of otherness: He 
views himself from outside himself, seeing himself 
as others see him. "He had never pictured himself 
that way before," the narrative consciousness 
reports Haze's thinking, and this perspective 
disturbs Haze not only because he sees his own 
physical deterioration in Layfield's . but 
also because he instinctively senses his own 
falseness in his double's. ( 107) 
Haze now understands that his quest for meaning in this 
world is doomed since whatever he declares to be true is but 
his self-projection. 
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Another incident which helps Haze reach this 
understanding is Enoch Emery's response to his call for a 
new Jesus. Enoch is a character who both parallels and 
contrasts with Haze. Like Haze, he is an adventurerfquester 
in the city. Unlike Haze, who rejects the material world at 
the end of the story, Enoch goes in the opposite direction: 
before he disappears from the story, he descends into the 
animal world by shedding his human clothes and donning a 
gorilla-outfit. Being such a worldly person, Enoch, like 
the rest of the people in Taulkinham, naively believes in a 
one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and the 
signified. When he hears Haze's call for finding a new 
Jesus for the Church Without Christ, Enoch becomes at once 
determined that he has located it--a mummy in the museum. 
As a result, he first takes Haze to see it, and the sight 
greatly horrifies Haze (CW 54-56). Then he steals it from 
the museum and delivers it to Haze. As Haze is still asleep 
when Enoch arrives at his residence, Enoch leaves it with 
Sabbath Hawkes, who cohabits with Haze. Sabbath later 
presents it to Haze and calls it their child, an act full of 
significance, for it implies that the mummy is the product 
of Haze's struggle in Taulkinham. Stunned again at the 
sight of the mummy, Haze snatches it and throws it against 
the wall, breaking it into pieces (CW 106). Haze is furious 
because he cannot believe that the god he calls for is a 
hollow body--an empty signifier. But such is indeed the god 
Haze and the people of Taulkinham have created for 
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themselves. 
O'Connor makes the point clear, though indirectly, in 
her narration of Sabbath's thoughts about the mummy. When 
Sabbath opens the parcel Enoch has left with her and sights 
the mummy, she is shocked, but, at the same time, she also 
perceives something familiar about it: "She had never known 
anyone who looked like him before, but there was something 
in him of everyone she had ever known, as if they had all 
been rolled into one person and killed and shrunk and dried" 
(CW 104). The mummy, as Stephens correctly points out, is 
an embodiment of our created gods: "Our false gods are, more 
than anything else, merely ourselves, our own shrunken, 
dried up, and above all, mortal--no matter how we try to 
escape it--selves" (61). Haze is one of these gods who have 
created the commercial world. But Haze is not aware of this 
now. He does not realize the world is a man-made universe, 
a text, on which we human beings as gods impose our own 
meaning, until he is stopped on the highway by a policeman, 
who destroys his Essex by pushing it over the road 
embankment on a hill. The policeman functions as the god of 
the establishment, enforcing its arbitrary law and 
regulations: when Haze asks the policeman why he stopped 
him, the policeman replies, "I don't like your face" (CW 
117). This answer is no mere tease. It reflects both the 
authoritative mentality he enjoys as a policeman and what is 
often a lack of any real objective basis for law enforcement 
actions. 
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What is more revealing is that the policeman destroys 
Haze's car simply because he does not like Haze as a person 
and because Haze does not have a licence (CW 117-18). 
Earlier in the story, O'Connor has highlighted this 
arbitrariness of our societal regulatory systems. After 
meeting Hawkes at the potato peeler salesman's show, Haze 
follows him in order to find out who he is. In his pursuit, 
Haze runs a red traffic light and is stopped by a policeman. 
"You know what that little thing hanging up 
there is for?" he [the policeman] asked, pointing 
to the traffic light over the intersection. 
"I didn't see it," Haze said. 
The policeman looked at him without saying 
anything. A few people stopped. He rolled his 
eyes at them. "Maybe you thought the red ones was 
for white folks and the green ones for niggers," 
he said. 
"Yeah I thought that," Haze said. "Take your 
hand off me." 
The policeman took his hand off and put it on 
his hip. He backed one step away and said, "You 
tell all your friends about these lights. Red is 
to stop, green is to go. • . . (CW 24) 
This seemingly comic scene about what the traffic lights 
mean exposes the total subjectiveness of our signification 
structure, and, in a larger sense, of all our arbitrarily 
man-made social systems. 
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Realizing finally the total fictionality of the world 
of which everyone is a creatorjgod, Haze blinds his eyes, 
throws money into the trash can, wears barbed wire around 
his chest, and walks with stones and glasses in his shoes. 
In this way, he willfully ends his own life, an act that, 
many critics believe, suggests his total rejection of the 
fictional realm of the natural world and his full embracing 
of the kingdom of Christianity. Yet the meaning of the 
denouement is probably not that simple and clear-cut. For 
example, both Hendin and Ben Satterfield in their separate 
studies consider the ending ambiguous and interpret it 
differently. Satterfield does not believe that there is any 
textual evidence to suggest that Haze is converted or 
redeemed, and he accuses those who read the ending as Haze's 
redemption of "hav[ing] some mystic ability to perceive 
things that are not in the book" (39). Hendin, on the other 
hand, regards Haze's final action as his self-affirmation: 
Haze maintains until the end the no-existence of 
Jesus. Since pain is the only attribute of life 
for him, perhaps he tortures himself to assert his 
own existence. His suffering is both proof that 
he has survived, and the price he pays for being 
alive. By clinging to silence, broken glass and 
barbed wire, Motes affirms himself and embraces 
his pain as the sign of his own life. (55) 
Though this reading suppresses the apparent religious 
overtone of the story's ending and though it is perhaps a 
48 
far cry from O'Connor's intention--O'Connor defines Haze as 
"a kind of a saint" (HB 89) and "a Christian malgre lui" (MM 
114)--it is not totally off base if we put Haze's whole 
story in perspective. 3 
Based upon Haze's persistent frantic denial of Jesus 
throughout most of the story, we shall perhaps not find it 
entirely improbable or illogical that Haze engages in self-
negation at the end as a form of self-affirmation. In fact, 
read as a whole, the story does not really encourage us to 
treat Haze's final actions as embracing Christ, because 
Haze's conversion, as some readers contend, seems too 
abrupt, or, "insufficiently motivated" (qtd. in Walters 61). 
Just before driving onto the highway and then being stopped 
by the policeman, Haze tells the gas station worker that "it 
was not right to believe anything you couldn't see or hold 
in your own hands or test with your teeth" (CW 116). But in 
no more than two or three hours, he is suddenly transformed 
from a sheer materialist to a pure spiritual believer, 
deciding to blind and starve himself. Of course, we may 
explain this rapid conversion in terms of Catholic 
mysticism--seeing it as testimony of God's mystic power, an 
explanation that O'Connor would certainly love. This is 
because O'Connor was a well known believer in religious 
mysticism (a fact shown especially in her enthusiastic 
advocacy of Teilhard), and, moreover, she calls Haze "a 
Christian malgre lui"--a person turned into a Christian by 
God's mystic power. In fact, O'Connor literally declares 
Wise Blood to be "a mystery," a mystery about Haze's 
inability to escape God (MM 114-15). 
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Hence, I believe that O'Connor--for whom "fiction is so 
very much an incarnational art" (MM 68) and for whom the 
ultimate reality is the Incarnation" (HB 92)--is trying at 
the end of the story to use mysticism to affirm her 
religious belief. That is, by having Haze blind and starve 
himself, she intends to suggest that Haze, driven by the 
undisputable power of God, finally repents his sins and 
accepts God, although, as I have argued, the denouement is 
not without ambiguity the way it is, and may assume obvious 
awkwardness when read the way she would like. O'Connor's 
purpose becomes clearer if we recall her condemnation of 
Enoch, who chose the material world--she has him degenerate 
into a gorilla. By juxtaposing Haze's life with that of 
Enoch, she aims obviously to glorify Haze's final choice--a 
purely spiritual life--and, in turn, to privilege the 
religious system over the commercial one, unaware that the 
two, as explained earlier, are not that much different and 
are often intermingled. We thus can hardly miss O'Connor's 
urge at the end to impose her religious vision on the 
reader, to force the reader to replace his/her vision with 
this privileged one. This is perhaps where O'Connor differs 
from Derrida and his followers. 
Derridean deconstructionists, we understand, do not 
attempt in their writing to replace one vision, or one term, 
with another, because they believe that to privilege one 
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term over another is to fall into the same practice one 
attacks and tries to avoid. Deconstruction, as Atkins 
writes, "refuses to rest with the replacement of one term of 
an opposition by the other, which serves merely to 
perpetuate hierarchization . . . . [Rather] deconstruction 
consists of an undoing/preserving that produces ceaseless 
reversal, reinscription, and oscillation of hierarchical 
terms" (5-6}. This certainly is not what O'Connor is doing. 
A staunch believer, O'Connor, in deconstructing beliefs she 
opposes, always tries to impose her privileged ones, 
allowing little "reversal" and "oscillation." In a sense, 
stephens is correct about O'Connor when she contends, 
what the reader constantly strives to achieve in 
O'Connor's books--a feeling for the humanity of 
the characters that transcends questions of 
conscious belief, a reaffirmation of his sense 
that there is a wide range of belief within which 
we can still respond to a character as a man or 
woman--is exactly the kind of liberal feeling 
towards belief that O'Connor means to attack. 
(105-6) 
Yet notwithstanding O'Connor's urge to assert her 
religious vision, her work itself, as the ambiguity of the 
ending illustrates, often thwarts her own efforts. Hence, 
Wise Blood works mostly as a powerful critique of our 
complacent belief in objective truth and meaning, and a 
thorough exposure of the fictionality of our world. Haze's 
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final realization of the nothingness of the universe and the 
meaninglessness of man's worldly endeavor is of extreme 
significance, for, as Schneidau points out, such 
consciousness may be our hope for a better understanding of 
human life: 
From the time we are disabused about Santa Claus, 
we are open to sudden revelations of 
meaninglessness or arbitrariness. The range of 
these experiences runs from blighting despairness 
to strenuous conversions . . . Sooner or later we 
are afflicted by the feeling that nothing matters, 
or "makes any difference," i.e., that we are 
unable to supply the differentiations which in 
primitive cultures are articulated by myth, so 
that our lives and purposes are reduced to 
entropy. We may flee to various cults, but doubt 
will have its turn at those. Thus latent Yahwism 
works within us, leavening all the lump. We are 
condemned to freedom, not because God is dead but 
because he is very much alive, as an agent of 
disillusionment in a basic sense. In this 
condition, it is not remarkable that we are 
nihilistic: what is remarkable is that we can 
become aware of it and can acknowledge 
intermittently the "nothingness of consciousness 
when consciousness becomes the foundation of 
everything." So with all self-deceptions: their 
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extent is not as remarkable as our awareness of 
them. We have reached out for the apple of 
selfknowledge, and in doing so have alienated God, 
nature, and each other; but by pressing our self-
awareness to its extreme, where we become 
alienated from ourselves, we find that this is not 
the end of the story. The Fall is only the 
beginning of the Bible. To be thus "decentered" 
(and, as I shall try to show, to be acutely 
conscious of the fictionality of things) is the 
precondition of insight: thus it is a felix culpa, 
good news from modern man of a somewhat unlikely 
kind. (48-49) 
Haze's story has, in a way, brought us such good news 
because it wakens us to the knowledge of our complacent 
self-deceptions, and urges us to quest forever for the apple 
of knowledge "we have reached out for." 
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Notes 
1. For such critical responses to the novel, see, for 
example, Josephine Hendin's The World of Flannery O'Connor, 
pp. 43-55; Isaac Rosenfeld' review article "To Win by 
Default"; and Martha Stephens' The Question of Flannery 
O'Connor, pp. 43-97. Stephens considers Wise Blood the 
"queerest of her [O'Connor's] books" (78). 
2. This is a phenomenon that has been clearly shown by 
Derrida in his close reading of Plato's argument against 
writing in Phaedrus and by De Man in his reading of 
Rousseau's figural writing. Refer to the introductory 
chapter for details on this point. 
3. I must make it clear that I am not here supporting 
Satterfield or Hendin; I am only using their arguments as 
examples to indicate that the novel's denouement may be read 
other than as showing Haze's complete conversion or 
redemption. In fact, I disagree with Satterfield's main 
argument that the ambiguity of the ending of the novel (as 
well as the ambiguity of O'Connor's many other stories) is 
the result of bad fiction writing and that O'Connor is a 
"religious propagandist" rather than a fiction writer (48). 
To deconstructionists, ambiguity in literary writing does 
not mean bad art at all; rather, it indicates the richness 
of literature. More important, it is the very ambiguity of 
her fiction, I will argue, that makes O'Connor such a great 
writer. O'Connor's fiction itself is not religious 
propaganda; only certain readings (O'Connor's own included) 
of the fiction are, i.e., some critics' interpretations 
make her fiction appear propagandistic. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FUSION OF THE INFUSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTION 
OF LOGOCENTRIC HERMENEUTICS 
O'Connor's position on hermeneutics and on 
signification as a whole is very complex. Being a 
sacramentalist, she "believe[s] the Host is actually the 
body and the blood of Christ, not a symbol" (HB 124); that 
is, she reads Biblical literature as reality rather than as 
a symbolic text. But as a writer of modern consciousness, 
O'Connor seems aware not only of the lack of a one-to-one 
correspondence between a text (the signifier) and its 
meaning (the signified) but also of the danger of 
interpreting the Bible literally. She censures people's 
effort to treat a text "as if it were a problem in algebra" 
and criticizes their drive to pin down its meaning (MM 71, 
73). In spite of her ambivalence on the issue, however, 
O'Connor's fiction, as we have seen in Wise Blood, features 
a prominent attack on fundamentalist hermeneutics which is 
characterized by an urge to treat Biblical words literally, 
an urge, as shown by Haze and the other people in 
Taulkinham, to locate physical referents for Biblical words 
so as to fuse the signifier with the signified. 
Although the whole O'Connor canon deals one way or 
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another with hermeneutics, "The River," "A Temple of the 
Holy Ghost," and "Parker's Back" stand out as stories 
devoted primarily to this issue. In this chapter, I will, 
through a close reading, try to demonstrate how these 
stories contribute to O'Connor's unconscious deconstruction 
of fundamentalistjlogocentric hermeneutics. I call this 
deconstruction her "unconscious" effort because she does not 
interpret these stories the way I do. This difference 
between our interpretations, however, does not devalue my 
reading because (intentional fallacy apart) O'Connor in her 
fiction, to quote Spivey's convincing argument again, "was 
seeking, quite unconsciously most of the time, to decompose 
her own view of the world, if not her style, in order to 
exorcise from her mind a !egocentrism that governed many 
aspects of her life and work" (278; emphasis added). 
Moreover, as Andre Bleikasten points out, reading O'Connor's 
work in terms different from those set by the author is what 
we now really need: 
So far, O'Connor's novels and stories have been 
read predominantly in analogical and anagogical 
terms along the orthodox guidelines she (O'Connor) 
so diligently supplied in her public statements. 
As a result, a great deal of O'Connor's criticism 
strikes one as heavily redundant and, in the last 
resort, fussily futile. To refresh our perception 
and appreciation of her work, what is probably 
needed now is a freer, less timorous and less 
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pious approach, focusing on the multiple meanings 
produced by the interplay of signifiers rather 
than on a unique, unequivocal transcendental 
signified equated with ultimate truth. {10) 
To begin my discussion of the stories, let me first 
turn to "The River." The story is about Harry/Bevel 
Ashfield, a four-year-old boy who, neglected by his parents, 
literally follows a preacher's call to plunge into the 
"river of Christ' and drowns himself. O'Connor considers 
the boy's action a baptism and sign of God's grace: "young 
Bevel's 'peculiar desire to find the kingdom of Christ' 
represents the 'working of grace for him'" (qtd. in Walters, 
76). Following O'Connor's interpretation, most critics read 
the boy's dying as a commendable religious act--"dying into 
life," as some call it--and they privilege Bevel's death 
over the corrupted materialistic life of his parents. But a 
close examination of the story will show that Bevel's death 
is more an indictment of fundamentalist hermeneutics than an 
affirmation of God's grace, and that the story condemns not 
only materialism but also fundamentalism. 
When the story opens, Mrs. Connin, Bevel's babysitter, 
is picking up the boy from his home, and she also learns 
that the boy's mother is sick. As a person who reads 
symbolic religious language in literal terms, Mrs Connin 
takes the boy, later that day, to the Reverend Bevel 
Summers, who is presiding over a river-side preaching 
service, and asks the preacher not only to baptize Bevel 
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but also to cure Bevel's mother by praying for her. Mrs. 
Connin is not the only one in the story who believes that 
faith can cure physical illness. During the preacher's 
service, two people, one lame, the other blind, testify to 
the truth of his healing the physically handicapped (CW 162-
64). Even Paradise, the only person in the audience who 
counters the preacher, rejects him simply because the latter 
could not heal the cancer in his ear. The fact that both 
the believers and the non-believers base their decision 
concerning religious truth on physical evidence is very 
revealing: the two groups do not differ very much in the 
final analysis. Both share the same desire to find some 
observable signified for religious words, i.e., both attempt 
to collapse the gap between the signifier and the signified. 
Bevel's parents and their friends also take a physical 
approach to religion, though in a different way. Like 
Hawkes and Shoats in Wise Blood, they interpret religion in 
explicitly material terms. After Mrs. Connin tells them 
that she has asked the preacher to pray for Bevel's mother, 
the boy's father answers, somewhat ironically though, 
"Healing by prayer is mighty inexpensive" (CW 167). In his 
answer, the two apparently different groups meet: on the one 
hand, we have those who try to heal by prayer; on the other, 
there are those who respond to such practices in monetary 
terms. Later, when they discover the classic Bible story 
book Bevel stole from Mrs. Connin, they see, again, only its 
monetary value and scramble for it: 
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She [Bevel's mother] threw the handkerchief down 
and held the book too high for him [Bevel] to 
reach and began to read it, her face after a 
second assuming an exaggerated comical expression. 
The others moved around and looked at it over her 
shoulder. "My God," somebody said. 
One of the men peered at it sharply from behind 
a thick pair of glasses. "That's valuable," he 
said. "That is a collector's item," and he took 
it away from the rest of them and retired to 
another chair. 
"Don't let George go off with that," his girl 
said . . (CW 167). 
To these people, the meaning of religion lies in its 
physical value. In this sense, these people resemble those 
who read the Bible literally and assess its truth on the 
basis of physical proof such as physical healing. 
The characters' desire for a complete fusion of the 
signifier with the signified is best shown in Summers's 
inability to distinguish between the river in which he 
stands and the river of Jesus's blood about which he is 
preaching: 
There ain't but one river and that's the River 
of Life, made out of Jesus' blood .... All the 
rivers come from that one River and go back to it 
like it was the ocean sea and if you believe, you 
can lay your pain in that River and get rid of it 
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because that's the River that was made to carry 
sin . . (CW 162) 
As Marshall Bruce Gentry points out, "While insisting that 
the river of Blood is the only river that matters, the 
preacher implies that the river before him--the one in which 
Harry/Bevel later drowns--is the same as the River of Life" 
(93). It is this kind of fusionjconfusion that leads Bevel 
to take literally what the preacher asks the "people with 
trouble" to do: ''lay in that River of Pain, and watch it 
move away toward the kingdom of Christ" (CW 162). Bevel 
obviously belongs to the "people with trouble" whom Summers 
calls upon. He is deeply troubled by the tremendous 
difference between the world the preacher's words have 
envisioned and the bleak world he has experienced at home, a 
loveless one characterized only by drunkenness and disorder. 
Following Summers's call, Bevel thus decides to escape the 
home-hell and to find "the Kingdom of Christ." 
But the boy's subsequent drowning-death does not truly 
symbolize, as some believe, a birth into life; it only 
indicates a jump from one hell to another--fleeing the hell-
home of his materialist parents, Bevel only plunges into the 
tomb-kingdom of those fundamentalist believers. The boy is 
a victim of both worlds. A scrutiny of Summers's baptizing 
of Bevel and the boy's final drowning will support my 
argument, for both events are described as horrifying 
experiences for the boy. Observe first how the preacher 
baptizes the boy: 
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Suddenly the preacher said, "All right, I am going 
to Baptize you now," and without more warning, he 
tightened his hold and swung him upside down and 
plunged his head into the water. He held him 
under while he said the words of Baptism and then 
he jerked him up again and looked sternly at the 
gasping child. Bevel's eyes were dark and 
dilated. (CW 165) . 
The word "suddenly" and, especially, the phrase "without 
more warning" are usually employed to forebode something 
unpleasant. Thus, they certainly discourage us from reading 
what to come as something positive. Moreover, the verbs, 
"swing," "plunge," and "jerk," portray the baptizing more as 
an act of abuse than as a sign of God's grace, for these 
actions are too violent to be used for baptism, considering, 
especially, that the baptized is only a pre-school child. 
Such a terrifying act will not leave Bevel appreciative at 
all of the sacred message it is supposed to carry. The boy, 
according to the narrator, is a pathetic sufferer of the 
baptizing: "The little boy was too shocked to cry. He spit 
out the muddy water and rubbed his wet sleeve into his eyes 
and over his face" (CW 165). 
Bevel's drowning at the end of the story is an equally 
painful experience: 
Bevel bounded into it [the river] with his shoes 
and his coat on and took a gulp. He swallowed some 
and spit the rest out • . . . He intended not to 
fool with preachers any more but to Baptize 
himself and to keep on going this time until he 
found the Kingdom of Christ in the river. He 
didn't mean to waste any more time. He put his 
head under the water at once and pushed forward. 
He put his head underwater at once and pushed 
forward. 
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In a second he began to gasp and sputter and his 
head reappeared on the surface; he started under 
again and the same thing happened. The river 
wouldn't have him. He tried again and came up, 
choking. This was the way it had been when the 
preacher held him under--he had had to fight with 
something that pushed him back in the face. He 
stopped and thought suddenly: it's another joke, 
it's just another joke! He thought how far he had 
come for nothing and he began to hit and splash 
and kick the filthy river. His feet were already 
treading on nothing. He gave one low cry of pain 
and indignation. (CW 170-71). 
In fact, in these two passages we discover that it is not 
only the child's terrible suffering that prevents us from 
reading the drowning as a worthy "death into life. 112 The 
narration, especially its somewhat ironic tone, also calls 
such a reading into question. For example, echoing the pre-
school child's consciousness, the statement that the boy 
"intended not to fool with preachers any more but to Baptize 
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himself" sounds not only ironic--ironic because he is 
following exactly what the preacher has told him to do--but 
also, in certain sense, comic, for few can help laughing 
when a four-year-old uses the phrase "fool with." The tone 
certainly undercuts the seriousness of the boy's intention. 
The same thing may also be said of the two sentences "The 
river wouldn't have him. He tried again and came up, 
choking," though the slightly comic tone here is tainted by 
bitterness. This is a tone often associated with black 
humor or dark comedies, and the tone is appropriate for the 
situation because what is happening to Bevel may be best 
defined as black humor. The boy has been told by the 
preacher that plunging into this river would lead him to the 
kingdom of Christ, but what he faces in doing so is nothing 
but pain and frustration. 
It is no wonder that Bevel thinks that "it's another 
joke, it's just another joke." His thought serves as an 
attack, a very appropriate one, on fundamentalist 
hermeneutics, for what is happening, as we outsiders see it, 
is, in many ways, truly a joke, a very cruel one though. 
Bevel's cry of "indignation" is the only logical response 
one can conceive of in such a situation. The word that is 
most revealing in this passage is "filthy" in the sentence 
"he [Bevel] began to hit and splash and kick the. filthy 
river." The sacred river, "the River of Life" the preacher 
proclaims it to be, turns out to be no more than a "filthy 
river." But what comes next (following the above quoted 
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passage) puzzles the reader, however. At the end of this 
penultimate paragraph, Bevel undergoes a sudden turnaround 
in his feeling about what is happening to him: "For an 
instance he was overcome with surprise; then since he was 
moving quickly and knew that he was getting somewhere, all 
his fury and his fear left him" (CW 171). This abrupt 
change in Bevel's feeling, I would like to argue, is the 
result of the narrator's/O'Connor's heavy-handed effort to 
affirm her religious belief, since O'Connor, as cited 
earlier, sees the boy's death as a journey into "the kingdom 
of Christ." Yet this forced note of affirmation is too weak 
to assert itself, for it is smothered by the preceding 
narration that portrays Bevel's drowning as a senseless 
suffering and a cruel joke. 
What makes O'Connor's interpretation more problematic 
is the last paragraph of the story where Mr. Paradise re-
emerges. The surprise reappearance of Paradise is very 
confusing if we are to read the story as celebration of 
Bevel's redemption. As A. R. Coulthard points out, "Not 
only does the final image of empty-handed Paradise invite 
what O'Connor might well consider a misreading, but Mr. 
Paradise virtually wrests the story from its protagonist at 
the conclusion" ("Deadly Conversions" 89). In fact, the 
problem is greater than that. As Coulthard further argues, 
O'Connor or the narrator seems to use Paradise, very 
awkwardly, to reinforce the notion of Bevel's redemption: 
O'Connor reintroduces Paradise at the end of the 
story by linking him with the redemptive sun 
symbol and, through heavy-handed color imagery, 
with the blood of Christ .... Then O'Connor 
rather clumsily points out the spot where Mr. 
Paradise sat "almost every day, holding an 
unbaited fishline in the water," a religious 
symbol which has no realistic basis. ("Deadly 
Conversions" 89) 
65 
It is very ironic to have Paradise, a person who treats 
religion exclusively in literal/material terms, "celebrate" 
Bevel's "embracing of God's grace," for such an arrangement 
not only undermines the significance of Bevel's action but 
also implies a possible connection between the old man and 
the boy, between, I believe, what Paradise practices and 
what Bevel is doing--interpreting religious preaching 
literally. Keeping in mind all the problems I have pointed 
out concerning O'Connor's interpretation of the story, I 
find her reading extremely questionable. Coulthard is right 
when he concludes, 
In "The River," O'Connor seems to want us to take 
what [Bevel's drowning] must reasonably be viewed 
as a naive, grotesque mistake to be either 
redemptive for Harry or spiritually enlightening 
for Mr. Paradise, or both. This is asking too 
much, and "The River" is O'Connor's most 




But if we read the story as a satire not only on materialism 
but also, and above all, on fundamentalism, the story is 
then not puzzling at all; rather, it is very illuminating. 
"A Temple of the Holy Ghost" also deals with the issue 
of hermeneutics. It satirizes people's attempt in 
interpreting the Bible to fuse the signifier with the 
signified, i.e., the attempt to hypostatize Biblical words. 
Although O'Connor (HB, 123-24) and many critics consider the 
story to be exclusively an explication of the Christian 
doctrine that "Humans are the Temples of the Holy Ghost," 
its narrative, I believe, shows it to be something else. 
Read closely, the story seems to be, above all, a 
castigation of those who try to read the doctrine in literal 
terms. And, determined by the context, the circus freak--
the story's central symbol, which many believe to embody the 
doctrine in question--serves as an indictment against the 
attempt to fuse spirit with the human body because it 
exhibits the ugliness of such a forced fusion. 
The story, told mostly from a twelve-year-old girl's 
point of view, evolves around two convent school sisters 
(her cousins) spending a weekend at their aunt's home. From 
the beginning, the doctrine is not treated as solemnly as we 
would expect it in a doctrine explication tale. The story 
begins as follows: "All week end (sic] the two girls were 
calling each other Temple One and Temple Two, shaking with 
laughter and getting so red and hot ... " (CW 197). Here 
the two fourteen-year-old sisters have turned the sacred 
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phrase into merely a word game. Yet they are not the only 
ones who play with the doctrine. Sister Perpetua, the oldest 
nun at the convent from whom the two sisters learned the 
doctrine for first time, told them that if a man "should 
'behave in an ungentlemanly manner with them in the back of 
an automobile' ... they were to say, 'Stop sir! I am a 
Temple of the Holy Ghost!' and that would put an end to it" 
(CW 199). On the surface, Perpetua's use of the doctrine 
differs from the two sisters' in that it is not just a joke, 
though the two sisters seem to have perceived it that way. 
But, whether for fun or for some practical reason, employing 
the doctrine in such a mundane manner, especially in such a 
sexual setting, makes the doctrine sound trivial and comic. 
This trivial and comic use of the doctrine, in turn, pokes 
fun at fundamentalist hermeneutics because such use follows 
a fundamentalist approach to Biblical doctrines: using the 
statement "I am a Temple of the Holy Ghost" to protect one's 
body presupposes not only that my body is literally a Temple 
of the Holy Ghost but also that I am the Holy Ghost itself, 
for the implication of the statement is that "if you violate 
me, you violate the holy Spirit." 
Such a literal wedding of the spirit with the body is 
ugly and grotesque. This is clearly suggested by the circus 
freak that the two convent sisters saw at the fair and which 
the twelve-year-old girl imagines to be "a temple of the 
Holy Ghost." 1 Though hermaphroditic gods are common in 
myth, the setting in which O'Connor puts the freak does not 
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encourage us to regard it as a union of God and man. 
Suzanne Morrow Paulson, who considers the freak's role 
ambiguous (both profane and sacred), correctly points out 
the problems of such a reading: "the profane setting 
overwhelms the sacred: the materialistic ends of freak shows 
appeal to the sexual curiosity of the masses. The physical 
reality of the hermaphrodite is an ugly reality that appears 
to deny the sacred nature of the world ... " (102). As 
evidence to support Paulson's argument, the two sisters see 
the freak solely as a queer sexual phenomenon, a fact that 
is best shown in the way they decide to describe the freak 
to the twelve-year-old girl. When the two sisters return 
from the fair, they first do not want to tell the girl (who 
did not go with them) what they saw because they do not 
think her old enough to know about it; but the girl tricks 
them into depicting it to her anyway: 
"I'm not as old as you all," she said, "but I'm 
about a million times smarter." 
"There are some things," Susan said, "that a 
child of your age doesn't know," and they both 
began to giggle. 
"Go back to your own bed," Joanne said. 
The child didn't move. "One time," she said, 
her voice hollow-sounding in the dark, "I saw this 
rabbit have rabbits." 
There was a silence. Then Susan said "how?" in 
an indifferent tone and she [the girl] knew that 
she had them. She said she wouldn't tell until 
they told about the you-know-what. Actually she 
had never seen a rabbit have rabbits but she 
forgot this as they began to tell what they had 
seen in the tent. (CW 206). 
69 
In exchanging the depiction of the freak for a story about 
rabbit-bearing, the two sisters obviously treat the freak as 
nothing more than something that serves to satisfy their 
sexual curiosity. Another problem involved in viewing the 
freak as a union of man and God is that the freak presents 
his existence to be more the result of Gods' punishment than 
His grace: "God made me thisaway and I don't dispute hit .. 
. . and if you laugh, He may strike you thisway" (CW 207). 
Such a presentation will no doubt lead people to question 
the benevolence of God. Even Walters, who considers the 
freak an incarnation of the union of man and God, admits 
this as a potential problem for her reading: 
Inevitably, additional questions are raised as to 
the responsibility of a cosmic agent which would 
permit the agony endured by the natural freak. 
What place does the grotesque human sufferer 
occupy in the scheme of a benevolent creator? . . 
. . This nihilistic impulse manifestly resides 
outside the conscious intent of the story itself, 
but the "demonic" thrust is undeniably there. 
{81) 
Hendin raises similar questions in her reading of the story: 
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O'Connor's treatment of the Holy spirit seems to 
be ironic, undercutting, as it does, its power as 
a traditional symbol of transcendence. All the 
outward signs of invisible grace shown by her 
characters are signs of mutilation, marks of 
deformity they cannot transcend. It may be that 
God can only be found in O'Connor's world in 
connection with finite, unredeemable human 
ugliness. ( 95) 
All these questions or charges will be valid--in fact, they 
can hardly be rebutted--if we are to read the freak as an 
embodiment of religious doctrine. But they will all be 
irrelevant if we consider the freak as an indictment of 
people's urge to fuse the spiritual and the material. 
A look at the twelve-year-old girl, especially her 
attitude towards both the freak image and religion, will 
also support the latter reading, for the girl's obsession 
and her own identification with the freak serve to further 
the story's satire on the attempt to fuse the spirit and the 
body. As the point of view character, the girl exposes 
herself, often through a double irony (for she does it 
mostly unconsciously), to be a prideful and mischievous, 
sometimes even mean, brat. She constantly thinks others 
stupid or ugly and laughs at them for it. "After observing 
them [the two sisters] for a few hours," she decided "that 
they were practically morons and she was glad to think that 
they were only second cousins and she couldn't have 
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inherited any of their stupidity" (CW 197). Herself a fat 
girl--for she is said to have "fat cheeks" (CW 198)--she 
notices in others only their physical imperfections: Susan's 
skinny body, Cheatam's bald head and dark face "with ruts 
and gulleys" . . . (CW 197-98). Though mean and prideful, 
the girl is ironically not unconcerned with her "spiritual 
soundness," for she wishes to be a saint and to go to 
heaven. She treats theological concepts both literally and 
practically. When she hears the phrase "Temple of the Holy 
Ghost," she immediately sees herself as such a temple, and, 
more important, she regards the phrase as "a present" to her 
that she can play with (CW 199). 
Later, realizing that she cannot go to heaven as a 
saint because of her pride, she decides that she can be a 
religious martyr, and she envisions herself literally killed 
as such: 
she began to prepare her martyrdom, seeing herself 
in a pair of tights in a great arena, lit by the 
early Christians hanging in cages of fire, making 
a gold dusty light that fell on her and the lions. 
The first lion charged forward but fell at her 
feet converted. A whole series of lions did the 
same finally the Romans were obliged to 
burn her but to their astonishment she would not 
burn down and finding she was so hard to kill, 
they finally cut off her head very quickly with a 
sword and she went immediately to heaven. She 
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rehearsed this several times, returning each time 
at the entrance of Paradise to the lions. (CW 204) 
Literal interpretations of theological ideas bring, however, 
no positive changes in the girl; rather, they serve only to 
sustain her prideful and repulsive character. Towards the 
end of the story, she and her mother accompany the two 
sisters back to the convent. When they arrive at the 
school, a nun asks them to attend a benediction in the 
chapel. Even there, the girl is still mean, laughing 
secretly at the people around her. She did not stop her 
"ugly thought" until "she began to realize that she was in 
the presence of God. Hep [sic] me not to be so mean, she 
began mechanically. Hep me not to give her [her mother] so 
much sass. Hep me not to talk like I do" (CW 208). She 
seems to repent here, "but when the priest raised the 
monstrance with the Host shining ivory-colored in the center 
of it, she was thinking of the tent at the fair that had the 
freak in it. The freak was saying, 'I don't dispute hit. 
This is the way He wanted me to be" (CW 208-9). 
The Host reminds her of the freak because both are 
corporealizations of the Word. To the girl, as O'Connor 
says, "the Host is actually the body and blood of Christ, 
not a symbol" (HB 124), and the freak is really a Temple of 
the Holy Ghost. The girl thinks of the freak and what he 
said here because she wants to identify with him as a 
"Temple of the Holy Ghost" so as to justify the way she is: 
"This is the way He wanted me to be." Hence, the girl will 
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not change. On the way home, she again observes only 
others' physical ugliness, this time, that of Alonzo, the 
driver: "The child observed three folds of fat in the back 
of his neck and noted that his ears were pointed almost like 
a pig's" (CW 209). Even critics who follow O'Connor's 
interpretation of the story see the child's observation here 
as problematic. Milles Orvell, for example, writes that the 
girl's contemptuous observation of Alonzo "tends 
(unintentionally, I think) to undercut the point of the 
story and hence to evoke uncertain response from the reader 
.... If we can laugh at Alonzo, why can't we laugh at the 
sideshow freak?" (47). Orvell is right in pointing out the 
problem the scene causes for O'Connor and her followers' 
interpretation of the story, but his last question is 
besides the point. What we shall laugh at is not Alonzo's 
or the freak's deformity but the girl's naive attempt to 
hypostatize theological concepts. Like Walters, Orvell 
considers the problem he perceives to be O'Connor's 
unintentional by-product, but whether intentional or 
unintentional, the problems are there, discouraging us from 
reading the story the way O'Connor desires. 
Like "A Temple of the Holy Ghost," "Parker's Back," one 
of O'Connor's last stories, also stages an attack on the 
fundamentalist urge to fuse the Word with its signified, an 
urge well exemplified in the story by its protagonist, o. E. 
Parker, who puts on his body, by tattooing, pictures of 
whatever he desires to be, including that of Christ. Again, 
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as with the two stories we have just examined, O'Connor and 
many scholars read this story differently. They see it as a 
defence of the belief in Incarnation--they consider Parker's 
tattooing of Christ on his back a true act of incarnation--
against, as O'Connor suggests, "the notion that you can 
worship in pure spirit," a notion advocated in the story by 
Parker's wife, Sarah Ruth whom O'Connor calls a "heretic" 
(HB 594). Although I do not have much trouble in agreeing 
with O'Connor that the story exposes Sarah as a "heretic" 
who presumes that one can arrive at the signified without 
the signifier, I do not think Parker's tattooing, presented 
as it is, is an act of Incarnation because even a rather 
casual reading of the story will reveal that the portrayal 
of Parker's obsession with tattooing is ironic and comic. 3 
The story castigates, I think, not only Sarah but also 
Parker: while Sarah is chastised for her urge to reach the 
signified without the mediation of signifiers, Parker is 
satirized for his apparent drive to collapse the signified 
into the signifier. The two do not really differ much 
because both are fundamentalists, though in different ways, 
and both presuppose the attainability of the transcendental 
signified. Since the problems with Sarah have been well 
considered, I will focus my discussion here mostly on the 
satire directed at Parker, an issue that seems to have 
escaped most critics' attention. 
One thing that is ironic about Parker is that he 
remains a staunch atheist until he has Christ tattooed on 
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his back (of course, here we have to suppose the act of 
tattooing to be the sign of his conversion). When he was 
merely a teenager, Parker was depraved. He drank and 
engaged in fights and blasphemy, and, more important, he was 
determined not to be "saved": 
His mother wept over what was becoming of him. 
One night, she dragged him off to a revival with 
her, not telling him where they were going. When 
he saw the big lighted church, he jerked out her 
grasp and ran. The next day, he lied about his 
age and joined the navy. (CW 658) 
But he stayed the same person in the navy, so the navy "put 
him in the brig for nine months and then gave him a 
dishonorable discharge;" after his dismissal from the navy, 
he went to the country where he "took various jobs which he 
kept as long as it suited him" (CW 659). Thus, we can see 
that Parker is a drifter or, as many critics suggest, a 
quester, but a quester, I will argue, only in the ironic 
sense because he never seems to know exactly what he is 
searching for and, more important, he carries out his quest 
in an extremely unusual way: tattooing on his body the 
images of what he happens to like in his search. This 
strange mode of questing, a major object of ridicule in the 
story, is the product of the desire to fuse the signified 
with the signifier, for, by putting the images of the things 
a person desires on his body, he attempts to make the image 
and his body merge so that the two may become an inseparable 
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entity--he may thus become the thing itself. When the 
signified is collapsed into the signifier in such a manner, 
the signifier becomes the only thing that counts. 
So, to Parker, the tattoos are the only reality: they 
are the sources of both his unhappiness and satisfaction. 
As we are told, he is being forever troubled by and 
dissatisfied with the tattoos he has. He even feels "as if 
the panther and the lion and the serpents and the eagles and 
the hawks had penetrated his skin and lived inside him in a 
raging war" (CW 659). But tattooing is simultaneously 
Parker's only solution to his problems and his only means to 
quench the thirst for the things he wants. Whenever he 
feels troubled or dissatisfied, "he would go off and find 
another tattooist and have another space filled up" (CW 
659). Tattoos have become the only things he cares for: 
"The only reason he worked at all was to pay for more 
tattoos" (CW 658). Even after his marriage to Sarah Ruth, 
who opposes his tattooing, Parker continues to add tattoos. 
Sarah protests against tattooing because, as a 
fundamentalist, she follows word for word the Bible, which 
prohibits any creation of images: "Thou shalt not make thee 
any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in 
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in 
the waters beneath the earth" ("Deuteronomy," 5:8; the same 
message is given almost verbatim in "Exodus," 20:4). Yet, 
ironically, Sarah is the one who motivates Parker to have 
Christ's image tattooed on his back. 
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Before his marriage, the images Parker had on his body 
were mostly those of the animals he admired. After their 
marriage, Sarah constantly chastises Parker for his atheist 
heresy and blasphemy. Bombarded by and tired of Sarah's 
preaching, Parker finally decides to have a picture of God 
tattooed on his back so as to please her. We are told that 
he wants this religious tattoo to be "a surprise for her" 
{CW 670), and he believes that "she would at least be 
pleased (by it]. It seemed to him that, all along, that was 
what he wanted, to please her" {CW 672). Another reason, a 
more immediate one, for Parker to have the tattoo seems to 
be the accident he had while working for an old woman on her 
farm--he crashed the tractor he was driving into a tree and 
burned it. Many scholars believe that the accident shocks 
Parker into realizing his sin and the power of God, making 
him convert. But such a conversion, if it is one, is comic 
and ironic on two accounts. First, the scene of the 
accident is portrayed in comic terms: 
He landed on his back while the tractor crashed 
upside down into the tree and burst into flames 
The first thing Parker saw were his shoes, quickly 
being eaten by the fire; one was caught under the 
tractor, the other was some distance away. {CW 
665) 
The fact that one's attention is directed to his shoes after 
so severe an accident makes the event look anything but 
solemn {this is an example of the tone problem O'Connor 
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acknowledged having: "It is too funny to be as serious as it 
ought"). Second, to show one's conversion by tattooing a 
picture of Christ on the back would undercut, in most cases, 
the seriousness of hisjher intention and, as a result, it is 
not likely to convince people about the conversion. That is 
why Parker fails to convince Sarah (of course, he also fails 
to please her). Telling him that the tattoo on his back is 
just "another picture," Sarah drives Parker away from their 
house by beating him with a broom (CW 675). The ending of 
the story makes Parker's "conversion effort" appear 
extremely ironical as it renders Parker a totally pathetic 
and comic person--he is reduced to a crying baby: "There he 
was--who called himself Obadiah Elihue--leaning against the 
tree, crying like a baby" (CW 675). 
The desire to fuse the spiritual with the material is 
not an urge peculiar to Parker (otherwise, the story's 
satire would be an effort wasted). It is a human tendency 
to merge the signifier and the signified so as to attain 
meaning--to make the meaning transparent or self-evident. 
In fact, as Theodore Gaster points out, there have always 
been people in history acquiring religious tattoos to show 
their spiritual faith: 
The custom of tattooing passed even into 
Christianity. In early centuries, baptism was 
known as "sealing," and this was also the ancient 
name for the rite of Confirmation, which 
originally followed immediately. Nor did the 
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custom survive only in a figurative sense. To 
this day the Catholics of Central Bosnia tattoo 
themselves with religious symbols ..•. and it is 
recorded of the German mystic, Heinrich Seuse, 
that he impressed the name of Jesus over his 
heart. {51-2) 
But, as we have seen in Parker's case, having the name of 
Jesus over one's heart does not ensure one's faith at all. 
Our wish to merge the signifier and the signified is 
not limited to the sphere of Biblical understanding. Since 
we human beings rely so much on the observable to determine 
the existence of things, we always desire such a merger or 
merging when we try to know and understand anything 
signified. What Parker's mother does in the story 
exemplifies this point. "She would not pay for any tattoo 
[for Parker] except her name on a heart, which he had put on 
.•. " (CW 658). By allowing only her name to be tattooed 
on Parker, she obviously wishes that her son would forever 
have her on his heart. {Please note: she permits only "her 
name on a heart.") That is, for her to know that Parker 
keeps her in his heart, she needs to see her name physically 
on it. Yet, just as having the name of Jesus carved on 
one's heart or the image of God on one's body does not 
ensure one's possession of faith, her having her name 
engraved on Parker's body does not guarantee that he will 
forever keep her in mind. With the satirizing of Parker 
extended to his mother, the story's attack on people's 
desire for the unity of the signifier and the signified 
reaches a scope we have not seen in "The River" and "A 
Temple of the Holy Ghost." 
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With Bevel's death, and Parker's reduction to a crying 
baby, we see clearly how dangerous and absurd 
fundamentalistflogocentric hermeneutics may be. In fact, 
O'Connor's work elsewhere also exhibits repeatedly the 
danger of taking the signifier for the signified. I would 
like to conclude this chapter by citing the ending of her 
story "The Comforts of Home" as one more example, a very 
illuminating one, to support my argument. Although the 
story is not concerned with Biblical hermeneutics, its 
denouement highlights, in a unique and very effective way, 
the danger and absurdity we are talking about. Thomas, its 
protagonist, hates and tries to drive out Sarah Ham, a 
delinquent girl his mother has brought home. After his 
mother's repeated refusal to make the girl leave, he goes to 
see the sheriff to have her arrested for taking his gun. 
Having arranged for the sheriff to come and search for the 
gun, he returns home, and finds, to his surprise, that gun 
is back where it belongs. He is so frantic that he decides 
to plant it in the girl's handbag. Caught by the girl while 
he is doing it and blasted by the girl in the presence of 
his mother, he counter-charges her of stealing the gun. 
Infuriated, the girl lunges at him, and he fires at her in 
return. But, as his mother has thrown herself between them, 
he kills his mother instead. 
81 
At this moment, the sheriff comes in and examines the 
scene. The story ends with his interpretation of what he 
sees: 
the fellow [Thomas] had intended all along to kill 
his mother and pin it on the girl . . . .As he 
scrutinized the scene, further insights were 
flashed to him. Over her body, the killer and the 
slut were about to collapse into each other's 
arms. The sheriff knew a nasty bit when he saw 
it. He was accustomed to enter upon scenes that 
were not as bad as he hoped to find them, but this 
one met his expectations. (CW 594) 
This denouement foregrounds the fact that it is too easy for 
us to misunderstand the signifier (what we see), especially 
when we look for what we expected--when we try to collapse 
the gap between the signifier and what it signifies)--just 
as the sheriff did. 
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Notes 
1. As mentioned above, many critics read the freak in 
entirely different terms. They believe that O'Connor uses 
the freak to symbolize the ideal of Christ being the union 
of both man and God--an ideal, though grotesque, we must 
accept. For such a reading, see Baumgaertner (77-81), 
Feeley (135-39), and Walters (77-81), each of whom offers a 
strict sacramentalistic interpretation of the story. 
2. The presentation of Bevel's final "baptism" is so 
horrifying that Mark Sexton also finds it problematic. But, 
instead of considering this presentation, as I am, an attack 
on fundamental hermeneutics, Sexton sees it as an indication 
of O'Connor's ambivalence towards vernacular religion: 
While the promise of this (Bevel's] final baptism 
would seem a triumph, its manifestation astounds 
and haunts the readers. Only as a result of the 
boy's pure desperation will the river accept him. 
In its simultaneous threat and deliverance, this 
final "baptism" is the culmination of the 
ambivalence of O'Connor's presentation of 
vernacular religion in "The River." (9) 
3. Even O'Connor, while writing the story, acknowledged 
the tone of the story as a problem: she wrote to a friend: 
"'Parker's back' is not coming along too well. It is too 
funny to be as serious as it ought . I have a lot of 
trouble with getting the right tone ." (HB 427). 
Although she might have thought she had the problem taken 
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care of when she published the story, I believe the story is 
still too funny to be read as she would like it to be. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IDENTITY OF NON-IDENTITY AND 
THE COLLAPSE OF SIGNIFICATION 
In addition to questioning fundamentalistjlogocentric 
hermeneutics, O'Connor's work also challenges, very 
successfully, people's logocentric belief in or desire for a 
pure, inherent self-identity. Since most of O'Connor's 
stories are concerned somehow with the issue of identity, I 
will treat, in this chapter, only the most representative 
ones and approach them, again, mostly in terms of 
signification. The stories I will discuss fall into two 
groups, with "Good Country People" and "A View of the Woods" 
forming one group; "Everything that Rises Must Converge," 
"Judgment Day," "Greenleaf," "Revelation," and "The 
Artificial Nigger" making up the other. In the first two 
stories, the protagonists stubbornly insist that their names 
signify their identities (their "true selves"), and they 
fight ferociously, though in vain, to maintain that 
impossible one-to-one relationship. The stories of the 
second group, on the other hand, satirize the people in the 
South who, amidst the collapse of Southern culture and its 
signification system, try to hold on to their disappearing 
"superior" identity. To understand better my argument, a 
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brief review of the modern sense of identity is helpful and 
necessary. 
"Since the era of speculative Idealism," asserts Martin 
Heidegger, "it is no longer possible for thinking to 
represent unity of identity as mere sameness, and disregard 
the mediation that prevails in unity" (15). Instead of 
sameness, identity, as Georg Gadamer suggests, is "the 
identity of identity and difference. Everything alive is 
bound by the 'other,' the world around it in the constant 
change of assimilation and secretion" (58). That is, in the 
modern world, we--as individuals, a community, or even a 
nation--can no longer live in isolation from others. 
Rather, in this unprecedented interdependent world, we are 
constantly being shaped and reshaped by the other--the non-
self. All cultures assimilate elements from others. Every 
nation's economy is interwoven with another's. That is why 
no one today can define clearly what being American really 
means. That is also why we no longer have a pure American 
economy (we have almost no pure American products; what we 
often have are products made abroad in the name of an 
American company or, sometimes, vice versa). On a 
philosophical level, without this difference within identity 
("the ontic ontological difference" in Heidegger's terms and 
"the differg_nce in Derrida's theory), human thinking would, 
as Atkins points out, be impossible: "in the movement of 
thought, elements are never fully present because they must 
always refer to something other than 'themselves'" (17). 
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But in general, despite the inherent difference within the 
self, we still tend to repress consciousness of the other so 
as to maintain the traditional concept of a pure, inherent 
self-identity, because the idea of identity gives us a sense 
of security and control. 
Hulga of the story "Good Country People" serves as a 
good illustration of the point. Her original name (given by 
her mother) was "Joy," but she changes it to "Hulga" because 
she does not think that "Joy" signifies her "identity"--a 
handicapped person with an artificial leg. To her, the ugly 
sound of "Hulga" better fits her deformed body, and more 
important, the name "Hulga" reminds her of the power she 
desires: she associates the name with the "ugly sweating 
Vulcan who stayed in the furnace and to whom, presumably, 
the goddess had to come when called" (CW 266-67). In short, 
she deems the new name an accurate signifier of her self--
an ugly outside with a powerful inside. This desire for 
identity between names and the named is not new; it can be 
traced to the ancient Greeks. Cratylus in Plato's The 
Dialogues, for example, firmly believes that names "are 
natural and not conventional," and that the names and the 
named are identical, for "he who knows names knows also the 
things which are expressed by them" (I:323, 383). Although 
Socrates does not totally agree with Cratylus, his desire 
for this identical relationship is no less: he tells 
Cratylus, "I quite agree with you that words should as far 
as possible resemble things" (I: 382). To rid us of a 
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desire so deeply rooted in Western tradition is thus no easy 
task. 1 
In renaming herself, Hulga also attempts to separate 
herself from her mother, Mrs. Hopewell, whose speech is full 
of platitudes, and who, she believes, knows only the 
surfaces of life. She thinks that she is so above her 
mother that she needs to teach her about the truth of life: 
To her own mother she had said--without warning, 
without excuse, standing up in the middle of a 
meal with her face purple and her mouth half full-
-"Woman! do you ever look inside? Do you ever look 
inside and see what you are not? God!" she had 
cried sinking down again and staring at her plate, 
"Malebranche was right: we are not our own light. 
We are not our own light!" (CW 268) 
In accusing her mother of not seeing what she is not, Hulga 
exposes the very problem she herself has--seeing herself 
superior to others. Here and elsewhere, she fills her 
speech with scholars' names to show her different identity 
as a Ph.D, and as such, she considers herself a person of 
profound understanding: she "had made it plain that if it 
had not been for this condition [the artificial leg], she 
would be far from these red hills and good country people. 
She would be in a university lecturing to people who knew 
what she was talking about" (CW 268). But the emergence of 
Manley Pointer, a Bible salesman, soon crushes the "Hulga" 
which she has created for herself. 
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With words like "Lady, I have come to speak serious 
things" (CW 270), Pointer appears simple and sincere to 
Hulga. Eager to identify the signifier with the signified, 
she fails to realize that all his words and his seeming 
innocence are empty signifiers that do not constitute a 
self. Consequently, she "decided that for the first time in 
her life she was face to face with real innocence" (CW 281). 
She is so happy that she wants to shape this innocent mind 
with her "deeper understanding of life" (CW 276). After 
some casual contact, she also believes that the boy really 
loves her, and she is so sure of his love that she fancies 
Pointer has bought the new hat he wears on their date 
particularly "for the occasion" (CW 277). Yet this date, 
both their first and last, brings all her fantasies to an 
end. On that day, when they are walking in the field, the 
boy tricks her into climbing into the loft of a barn they 
see: 
It was a large two-story barn, cool and dark 
inside. The boy pointed up the ladder that led 
into the loft and said, "It's too bad we can't go 
up there." 
"Why can't we?" she asked. 
"Your leg," he said reverently. 
The girl gave him a contemptuous look and 
putting both hands on the ladder, she climbed it 
while he stood below, apparently awestruck. (CW 
279) 
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As soon as they are in the loft, Pointer begins to fulfil 
his scheme of taking her wooden leg away. He kisses her and 
declares that he loves her. At first, Hulga does not 
respond to his show of "love," but she soon gives in. At 
his request, she not only says that she loves him but also 
shows him her artificial leg, something she has showed no 
one else before. Moreover, she demonstrates to him how to 
take the leg off and lets him do it. 
After he has the leg in his possession, he puts it in 
his valise. As he is doing so, Hulga is surprised to 
discover that the valise contains "only two Bibles in it," 
and, more important, that the Bibles are fakes: "He took one 
of these [the two Bibles] out and opened it. It was hollow 
and contained a pocket flask of whisky •.. " (CW 282). 
With "I hope you don't think ... that I believe in that 
crap [meaning Christianity]!" Pointer walks away with 
Hulga's wooden leg, revealing his real intention and, in 
turn, proving Hulga to be a truly naive, superficial person 
like her mother. Frederick Asals offers an excellent 
elaboration of this point: 
. . . the girl has not, as she thinks, escaped her 
mother and her mother's values: the entire 
identity of "Hulga" is built on them. Her 
academic nihilism is riddled with such cliches as, 
''we are all damned . . . but some of us have taken 
off our blindfolds and see that there's nothing to 
see. It's kind of salvation." If the language 
90 
is more sophisticated than any at Mrs. Hopewell's 
command, it is no less trite, and the smug self-
deception underlying it ("I don't have illusions") 
is, if anything, greater. ("The Double" 61). 
In making all those nihilistic remarks, Hulga, like Haze in 
Wise Blood, is really driving for super truth, a truth she 
claims only she knows. But as it turns out, such truth is 
no more than self-deception. A victim of such deception, 
Hulga pays a very dear price: at the end of the story, she 
is left alone in the loft of the barn without her artificial 
leg. 
Like Hulga, Mark Fortune in "A View of the Woods" also 
insists on a one-to-one correspondence between his name and 
his self-identity, and he clearly distinguishes himself from 
others, even from his daughter and daughter-in-law, the 
Pitts. Though he has permitted the Pitts family to live on 
his estate, he will not allow them to name their children 
after him: he tells them that if they "couple his name with 
Pitts he would put them off the place" (CW 527). But he 
changes his mind when Mary Fortune comes: he "suggested 
himself that they name her Mary Fortune," simply because 
"she bore his unmistakable resemblance" (CW 527). To him, a 
Fortune's face means a Fortune's reality, and, as such, it 
requires a Fortune's name. 2 
Unable to see any difference between appearance and 
reality, old Fortune always flatters himself that Mary is a 
pure Fortune. So he fancies that Mary resembles him not 
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only in looks but also on the inside: "but she was like him 
on the inside too. She had, to a singular degree, his 
intelligence, his strong will, and his push and drive" (CW 
526). He is so eager to see Mary as a pure Fortune that he 
will not look at her in any other way. As the narrator 
comments, "The fact that Mary Fortune was Pitts too was 
something he ignored . • . . He liked to think of her as 
being thoroughly of his clay" (CW 528). Later, however, the 
old man and his grand-daughter get into an argument over a 
strip of land between their house and the road: while the 
old man wants to sell it, Mary wants to keep it as the 
children's playground. As old Fortune begins to sense 
differences between him and Mary, he feels as if there are 
certain Pitts characteristics in the girl, a fact he cannot 
tolerate: 
"Are you a Fortune," he said [to Mary], "or are 
you a Pitts? Make up your mind." 
Her voice was loud and positive and 
belligerent. "I'm Mary-Fortune-Pitts," she said. 
"Well I," he shouted, "am PURE Fortune!" (CW 
541) 
It is no accident that O'Connor capitalizes the whole word 
"PURE." She does so, I believe, to highlight the old man's 
obsession with the idea of pure identity. 
To Mark Fortune, Mary can only be either a Fortune or a 
Pitts, with no mediation in between, i.e., no "Mary-Fortune-
Pitts" as Mary presents it. So, when Mary fights with him 
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at the end of the story, he is totally puzzled and extremely 
infuriated. He simply cannot stand "the face that was his 
own but had dared to call itself Pitts," and he is 
determined to annihilate it (CW 545). But in destroying 
Mary, he also kills himself--he dies of a heart attack 
caused obviously by the exhausting fight he has with her. 
Most ironically, not until his death does the old man seem 
to learn that there is no identical relationship between a 
Fortune face and a Fortune person: "The old man looked up 
into his own image (Mary's face]. It was triumphant and 
hostile. 'You been whipped,' it said, 'by me,' and then it 
added, bearing down on each word, 'and I'm PURE Pitts'" (CW 
541). In this final imagined scene, the old man, for the 
first time, allows his own image to call itself a Pitts. 
But the price of this lesson is too high for him to pay. 
The protagonists of the five stories to be discussed 
are also obsessed with their identities, the identities they 
and their ancestors have invented for themselves in the 
process of the creation of their culture--American Southern 
culture. With traditional culture disintegrating, or 
becoming "fractured" in O'Connor's word (MM 140), people's 
established identities are also rapidly vanishing. As 
explained in the earlier chapters, each culture has its own 
signification systems, which, in turn, sustain its values 
and beliefs, including people's identities. So the collapse 
of traditional Southern culture has also caused a lack of 
referential meaning in the South. For example, a white face 
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no longer necessarily signifies a traditional white 
identity, and a higher birth no longer guarantees a higher 
class status. But many people, such as the protagonists of 
our stories, will not accept what is happening and are still 
attempting, often desperately, to maintain their crumbled 
signification structure so as to hold on to their cherished 
identities. 
In "Everything that Rises Must Converge," both Julian 
and his mother battle very hard, though in different ways, 
to keep their fading status as the descendants of a once 
renowned and wealthy family--Julian's mother tells him his 
"great-grand father was a former governor of the state" and 
his "grandfather was a prosperous landowner" {CW 487). To 
keep her status, the mother participates in the "Y reducing 
class," and more important, she "was one of the few members 
of the Y reducing class who arrived in hat and gloves and 
who had a son who had been to college" (CW 486). She wears 
the hat and gloves because, to her, they are the symbol of 
her class: "She was holding herself very erect under the 
preposterous hat, wearing it like a banner of her imaginary 
dignity" {CW 489). Once, however, when she is in a bus, a 
black woman with a little boy gets on wearing a hat 
identical to her own, a sign reminding her that the black 
woman and she now share equal status. Yet the mother will 
not acknowledge the fact. She denies the implied 
relationship between them as a comic impossibility by 
imaging the woman as a juggling monkey: she feels "as if the 
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woman were a monkey that had stolen her hat" (CW 496) . She 
supposes that the black woman stole her hat because she 
simply cannot imagine the symbol of her "wealthy" and 
"dignified" white identity on a black woman. To defend her 
"superiority," she then tries to patronize the black woman 
by offering her little boy a "shining new penny" when they 
get off the bus. Outraged at her condescension, the woman 
batters her with a huge handbag. Shocked by the woman's 
act, Julian's mother then suffers a stroke. 
Her death symbolizes the impossibility of retaining the 
traditional white identity and teaches a dear lesson to 
Julian, who, as John F. Desmond puts it, "is just as elitist 
as his mother, just as proudly isolationist in his stance 
toward the real historical process, though he protests that 
it is only she who needs to face reality" (70). Julian's 
relationship to his mother is very much like Hulga's to 
hers. As Hulga is a "sophisticated" copy of her mother, so 
is Julian of his, despite the efforts of each to think 
otherwise. On the surface, Julian despises his mother's 
nostalgia for the family's past. Whenever she talks about 
the mansion the family used to possess, he reproves her and 
calls the mansion "that decayed mansion," but, as the 
narrator tells us, 
it [the mansion) remained in his mind as his 
mother had known it. It appeared in his dreams 
regularly. He would stand on the wide porch, 
listening to the rustle of oak leaves, then 
95 
wandering through the high-ceilinged hall into the 
parlor that opened onto it and gaze at the worn 
rugs and faded draperies. It occurred to him that 
it was he, not she, who could have appreciated it. 
He preferred its threadbare elegance to anything 
he could name and it was because of it that all 
the neighborhoods they had lived in had been a 
torment to him--whereas she had hardly know the 
difference. (CW 488} 
The fact that the mansion appears regularly only in 
Julian's dreams is very interesting; it illustrates Freud's 
theory that the thing that a person considers as the other 
(non-self) and suppresses in himself will eventually 
resurface, often in dreams, as his very self. It is what 
Freud would call the "deferred" self. Consciously, Julian 
may despise his mother for longing for the past--the elite 
status--but deep in his mind, he emulates her in what she 
yearns for, as is shown clearly in the above passage. In 
fact, whenever Julian does something as a revolt against his 
mother, he exposes himself to be merely a duplicate of her 
in a slightly different form. To protest his mother's 
racist attitude, Julian decides to make some black friends, 
but only a special type: "some distinguished Negro professor 
or lawyer;" yet, as we are told, "he had never been 
successful" in his design because, to his disappointment, 
the two "distinguished-looking" blacks he tried to become 
acquainted with turned out to be an undertaker and a street 
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gambler (CW 494). His revolt is thus only a modified drive 
for the high status his mother wishes to maintain. 
Like Julian and his mother, Tanner of "Judgment Day" 
also insists in vain on maintaining his vanishing wealthy 
white identity. Once a land owner, he wants people not only 
to recognize his white face but also to treat him as a white 
master. When he first met Coleman, whom he was to turn into 
his servant, Tanner made him a pair of eye glasses from a 
piece of bark and some hay wire, and he then asked him to 
look through the glasses: 
" .What you see through those glasses?" 
"See a man." 
"What kind of a man?" 
"See the man make theseyer glasses." 
"Is he white of black?" 
"He white!" the negro said as if only at that 
moment was his vision sufficiently improved to 
detect it. "Yessuh, he white!" he said. 
"Well, you treat him like he was white," Tanner 
said. (CW 684) 
In the following forty years Tanner made sure Coleman 
followed his words and established a firm master-servant 
relationship with him. In his words, Tanner has made "a 
monkey" out of Coleman, and he will not let the reverse 
happen: "You make a monkey of one of them [blacks] and he 
jumps on your back and stays there for life, but let one 
make a monkey out of you and all you can do is kill him or 
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disappear" (CW 684). Later, he does disappear, though very 
unwillingly and feeling very shocked, after he has lost his 
land. 
Tanner is so preoccupied with his supposed status as a 
white man that, even after he has lost his land, he refuses 
to work for the black doctor who has "usurped" his position. 
He will not work for the black because, he tells the doctor, 
"The government ain't got around yet to forcing the white 
folks to work for the colored," and because he does not want 
to be "a nigger's white nigger" (CW 684-85). In order not 
to work for black people, Tanner goes to stay with his 
daughter in an apartment in New York city, but he soon finds 
himself in a much worse situation: he is totally deprived of 
the identity he is used to. Yet, like Julian's mother, he 
still will not give up his white "superiority." When a 
black has moved into the apartment next to his daughter's, 
he tries to approach him as he would Coleman but he is 
disappointed. The black neighbor will not even answer him. 
He is totally puzzled, telling the black: "I was getting 
along with niggers before you were born" (CW 688) . The 
irony is that he does not seem to realize that the 
relationship he had with Coleman is no longer what most 
whites and blacks have now. 
Tanner becomes so outraged at the black's attitude that 
he flares up, telling the latter sarcastically: "'And you 
ain't black,' he said 'And I ain't white'" (CW 690). By 
this sarcasm, Tanner wishes to place the black in his 
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"proper" place and keep the difference between them. But, 
despite his resistance to being merged with blacks, Tanner 
is physically (and symbolically) fused with them when the 
black neighbor kills him by thrusting his head and arms 
through the spokes of the banister. "This violent 
convergence with a hostile Negro on the physical level," as 
McFarland suggests, "brings out, on the spiritual level, a 
convergence with 'otherness'--what is not oneself, and 
especially what is feared and despised as alien and 
inferior" {70). The biggest irony is that Tanner, even 
right before his death, still lives on his imagined 
identity. After being in the city for a while and realizing 
that he is worse-off there, he decides to go back to the 
country, to Coleman, specifically, with whom he hopes he can 
preserve his master position. His wish to go back to 
Coleman is so strong that he is determined that, if he dies 
on his way home, his dead body should only be turned over to 
Coleman: "he had written a note and pinned it in his pocket. 
IF FOUND DEAD SHIP EXPRESS COLLECT TO COLEMAN PARRUM, 
CORINETH, GEORGIA" (CW 676) . 
Mrs. May of "Greenleaf" suffers the same fate for 
insisting on her superior identity. Also a land owner, she 
fears the invasion of her space by the Greenleafs (her 
tenant's family), especially their two prosperous sons who 
have their own growing farms and who form a sharp contrast 
to her two "degenerate" good-for-nothing sons. While the 
two Greenleaf sons not only have their own farms but also 
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are married, each with three children, neither of her sons 
has a successful career (they do not even care about her 
farm at all), and neither is married. And, what is worse, 
while Wesley, her younger son, is physically weak, Scofield, 
the older one and an insurance salesman, seems, to her, 
deficient in intelligence and poor at business: "She would 
not have minded his selling insurance if he had sold a nicer 
kind but he sold the kind that only Negroes buy" {CW 504). 
Hence, she is constantly fretted by the prospect of the 
Greenleafs taking over her place. She fears: "When she was 
dead and gone from overwork and worry, the Greenleafs, 
healthy and thriving, would be just ready to begin draining 
Scofield and Wesley" {CW 509). 
The invasion of her place by the Greenleafs is 
symbolized by a bull which belongs to the two Greenleaf 
brothers and which has run onto her estate. The story opens 
with the bull chewing, one night, by the window of Mrs. 
May's bedroom. She tries to drive it away as an unwelcome 
guest--as a non-self--but she fails. So the whole night, 
she is bothered, even in dreams, by this invading other 
which, she fears, is coming to take over the place: 
She had been conscious in her sleep of a steady 
rhythmic chewing as if something were eating one 
wall of the house. She had been aware that 
whatever it was had been eating as long as she had 
had the place and had eaten everything from the 
beginning of her fence line up to the house and 
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now was eating the house and calmly with the same 
steady rhythm would continue through the house, 
eating her and the boys, and then on, eating 
everything but the Greenleafs. (CW 501} 
The bull in her dream eats only her and her family, but not 
the Greenleafs, because, to Mrs. May, the bull is the very 
symbol of the Greenleafs. It is the Greenleafs who are 
taking away her place step by step (rhythmically like the 
bull's chewing). She is determined to stop the invasion by 
stopping the bull. What follows in the story is her 
desperate struggle to drive this bull, this terrible other, 
from her farm. 
Again she fails, and what is more ironic, at the end of 
the story, the bull, a symbol of the other (the Greenleafs), 
finds its referent, instead, in her--the bull buries its 
horns into her bosom, completely destroying her dream of 
maintaining her distinction from the other. She seems to 
have learned the lesson, for "she felt the quake in the huge 
body as it sank, pulling her forward on its head, so that 
she seemed, when Mr. Greenleaf reached her, to be bent over 
whispering some last discovery into the animal's ear" (CW 
525). As she is whispering her new intimation to the 
animal, she seems to have fused with Mr. Greenleaf, her 
truly feared other. This is suggested by the inserted 
clause "when Mr. Greenleaf reached her." As it is put in 
the sentence, the clause is very vague, making it seem that 
Mrs. May is not just fusing with the bull but also with Mr. 
Greenleaf who also "reached her" when the bull buried its 
horns into her. 3 
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Just as Mrs. May's dream for her identity is crushed, 
so is disrupted Mrs. Turpin's (in "Revelation") illusion of 
an identity between, on the one hand, respectable behavior, 
industry, and cleanness, and, on the other hand, a state of 
spiritual superiority. Mrs. Turpin always feels proud of 
being a hardworking person and differentiates herself from 
not only blacks but also those whites whom she considers 
"trash." She flatters herself that God "had not made her a 
nigger or white-trash or ugly! [though we know otherwise, 
for she is unusually over-weight.] He had made her herself 
and given her a little of everything. Jesus, thank you! she 
said" (CW 642). And she thinks that she and her family are 
so clean that their pigs are cleaner than other people's 
children: "Our hogs are not dirty and they don't stink ... 
. They are cleaner than some children I've seen" (CW 638). 
She is so concerned with the differences between people that 
she often "occupied herself at night naming the classes of 
people" {CW 636). 
Her sense of a superior identity is not challenged 
until she encounters an "ugly" girl who strikes her with a 
book and tries to strangle her. They are in a doctor's 
office, waiting to see the doctor. During the whole time, 
Mrs. Turpin keeps bragging about herself, her family, and 
her knowledge and understanding of the world, though her 
talk often betrays that she is not much different from the 
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woman whom she deems "white trash." For example, when the 
"trash" woman suggests that all blacks should be sent back 
to Africa, Mrs. Turpin "refutes" her, "There's a heap of 
things worse than a nigger," but, when she further explains 
the reason why black people should stay in this country, she 
reveals herself to be no less a racist: "'Nooo,' they're 
going to stay here where they can go to New York and marry 
white folks and improve their color. That's what they all 
want to do, every one of them, improve their color" (CW 640, 
641). The girl becomes so tired of Mrs. Turpin's complacent 
platitudes that she charges at her and calls her "wart hog 
from hell." Astounded, "Mrs. Turpin felt entirely hollow 
except for her heart which swung from side to side as if it 
were agitated in a great empty drum of flesh" (CW 645, 646). 
She is shocked because she cannot believe that the hog, 
an image that she once thought stood only for the dirty or 
ugly, would be applied to her: "'I am not,' she said 
tearfully, 'a wart hog. From hell.' But the denial had no 
force. The girl's eyes and her words, even the tone of her 
voice, low but clear, directed only to her, brooked no 
repudiation" (CW 647). The next day, for the first time, 
Mrs. Turpin will not take her black neighbors' compliment 
about her being "sweet," and "pretty," but even then, she 
tries to maintain her difference: "You could never say 
anything intelligent to a nigger. You could talk at them 
but no with them" (CW 650). More significant, at the end of 
the story when she seems to have acquired, in reverie, a 
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vision of her marching to heaven in the same procession with 
blacks and "white trash," she still will not give up her 
separate identity from them: 
There were whole companies of white trash, clean 
for the first time in their lives, and bands of 
black niggers in white robes and battalions of 
freaks and lunatics shouting and clapping and 
leaping like frogs. And bring up the end of the 
procession was a tribe of people whom she 
recognized at once as those who, like herself and 
Claud [her husband], had always had a little of 
everything and the God-given with to use it right. 
(CW 654) 
Even being left at the end of the procession does not seem 
to bother her, since she is pleased that she and her like 
are together, not mixed with the other kinds. But the fact 
that she and her people are the last to go to heaven denies 
or puts into question the existence of a correspondence she 
supposes between her hardworking, clean people and their 
superior spirituality. 
"The Artificial Nigger" exposes the impossibility of a 
pure, inherent self-identity in a most intriguing way. The 
issue is treated on a double level. On one level, we have 
Mr. Head try, in vain, to distinguish himself from his 
grandson Nelson, and, on another level, we have both Mr. 
Head and Nelson discover that they are not, as they used to 
think, above black people. Based upon his age, Mr. Head 
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firmly believes in his superior wisdom and knowledge, 
worldly and spiritual, in relation to Nelson. Because the 
boy seems too prideful and never listens to him, he decides 
to teach the boy a lesson by taking him on a trip to the 
city in which the boy was born but from which he was taken 
after his birth and to which he has never returned. 
Imagining himself as "Vergil summoned" to teach "Dante," the 
old man considers the trip a "moral mission": 
"The day is going to come," Mr. Head prophesied, 
"when you'll find you ain't as smart as you think 
you are." He had been thinking about this trip 
for several months but it was for the most part in 
moral terms that he conceived it. It was to be a 
lesson that the boy would never forget. (CW 211) 
But from the start, the boy will not see it that way. When 
the old man tries to establish his position as a "guide" by 
telling the boy that he has been to the city twice, the boy 
counters, "If you ain't been there in fifteen years, how you 
know you'll be able to find you way about?" (CW 211). The 
boy turns out to be right, for the old man loses his way not 
long after they enter the city. 
But even in this alarming situation, Mr. Head still 
will not forget his guiding role and is eager to teach the 
boy a lesson. When, tired of walking aimlessly around, they 
stop to rest and Nelson dozes briefly, the old man hides 
himself round a corner, hoping to frighten the boy when he 
wakes up. Startled upon wakening, Nelson dashes off into 
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the street with such speed that the old man loses him. When 
he finally finds the boy, Mr. Head is stunned to see the 
boy, terror-driven, sitting on the ground with an elderly 
woman, who is yelling at him, "you've broken my ankle and 
your daddy'll pay for it" (CW 226). Seeing his grandfather, 
Nelson rushes to him, but to his great surprise and dismay, 
the old man denies knowing him. This denial, so 
unbelievable to everyone on the scene, also makes Mr. Head 
feel disgraced, and this disgrace, in turn, destroys the 
intellectually superior and morally dignified identity he 
had held for himself. So, ironically, in denying Nelson 
without, the old man in fact acknowledges Nelson the other 
within, since the latter is, as Preston M. Browning well 
puts it, "the living embodiment of Mr. Head's intellectual 
pride and moral boasting" (63-64). 
What is destroyed on this trip to the city is not just 
Mr. Head's imagined superiority relative to Nelson but also 
the two's shared condescension toward black people. on the 
train to the city, they ran into a black family passing 
through their aisle. While Nelson, having not seen a black 
before, did not recognize that they were black people and 
paid little attention to them, Mr. Head looked at them as if 
he were seeing a circus show. Then Mr. Head laughed at the 
boy for not recognizing blacks, which humiliated Nelson and 
made him hate black people, and more important, "he 
understood now why his grandfather disliked them" (CW 216) . 
It is here we learn explicitly of the old man's racist 
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attitude toward blacks. The superior position he and the 
boy feel they hold relative to black people disappears, 
however, when they are in the city where, as we know, they 
lose their way. They turn to blacks for help, for 
direction, an experience that greatly changes Nelson. After 
a black lady tells him the way, Nelson "suddenly wanted her 
to reach down and pick him up and draw him against her and 
then he wanted to feel her breath on his face." (CW 223). 
This apparently strange feeling of his is, however, very 
significant because it suggests that Nelson now acknowledges 
his connection with the formerly considered non-self, the 
"other." 
Both Mr. Head's and Nelson's understanding of their 
undeniable connections with the other is reinforced when 
they encounter a battered plaster statue of a black on a 
fence. The experience they have just had enables them to 
look at the "nigger" in a new light. The miserable looking 
"nigger" seems to them an indictment of their inflated pride 
and unfounded superiority because, as the "nigger" is 
artificial, the image of blacks as inferior and white as 
superior is also man-made, made especially by conceited 
people like themselves. staring at the statue, a signifier 
supposed to stand only for the "inferior" blacks, they seem 
to find themselves in it--the frail and fallible men of all 
time and all races. Being frail and fallible creatures, all 
human beings are connected, including--besides Mr. Head and 
Nelson--Hulga, Fortune, Julian and his mother, Tanner, Mrs. 
107 
Turpin, and, of course, all of us who share an identity in 
non-identity. In addition, with the hat, a symbol of 
Julian's mother's status, put on a black woman, Tanner's 
land repossessed by the black doctor, the horns of the 
Greenleafs' bull buried in Mrs. May's body, the image of hog 
imposed on Mrs. Turpin, and finally the "artificial nigger" 
symbolically connected with Mr. Head and his grandson, we 
have certainly seen a vivid parade of the total collapse of 
signification in the South and, in a larger sense, in the 
modern world as a whole. 
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Notes 
1. For example, even O'Connor, who is here satirizing 
Hulga for harboring such a desire, is not immune to it. 
O'Connor's position on naming is, of course, not easy to 
define. Once, in answering "a Professor of English" who 
inquired about what some of her characters' names meant, she 
wrote, "As for Mrs •. May (protagonist of "Greenleaf"], I must 
have named her that because I knew some English teacher 
would write and ask me why. I think you folks sometimes 
strain the soup too thin" (HB 582). But, on an earlier 
occasion, she reproved Ben Griffin, another professor, for 
misnaming Motes by correcting him: "Motes, not Moates" (HB 
89). This correction is significant, for, as A. R. 
Coulthard suggests, "O'Connor was never finicky about 
spelling, so she must have had the name's symbolic 
connection with the biblical mote in mind when she insisted 
on its correct spelling" ("Names" 97). A look at some of 
her characters' names may also reveal O'Connor's ambivalence 
on the issue. While she seems to play with some of her 
characters' names, making them sound ironic (such as 
Farebrother in "The Comfort of Home" and Sheppard in "The 
Lame Shall Enter First), she painstakingly names many of her 
characters, as Coulthard demonstrates, to symbolize what she 
intends these names to (such as Misfit in "A Goodman Is Hard 
to Find" and Hawkes in Wise Blood). 
2. Fortune's change of mind here reminds us of 
Parker's on the use of his own name, a case that further 
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exemplifies people's belief in the identity between names 
and the named. Parker's given name is Obadiah (an Old 
Testament Prophet's name meaning "the Lord servant") and 
Elihu (who appears in the Book of Job as a God follower). 
But as an atheist, Parker never used the name (he only uses 
the initial O.E.): "He had never revealed the name to any 
man or woman, only to the files of the navy and the 
government. • . . When the name leaked out of the navy 
files, Parker narrowly missed killing the man who used it" 
(CW 662). He would not even tell Sarah his name when he 
first met her. After her insistence on knowing it, he 
merely whispered it into her ear, and he did not forget to 
warn her not to use it: "If you call me that aloud, I'll 
bust your head open" (CW 662). Parker would not use this 
name because he did not think that it signified his true 
identity, an atheist. But at the end of the story, as 
Coulthard points out, "when Parker identifies himself by his 
spiritual name for the first time [though this identity is 
questionable as I explained in last chapter], 'he felt the 
light pouring through him, turning his spider web soul into 
a perfect arabesque'" ("Names" 98); and he uses the name, 
for the first time, when he is requesting his wife to let 
him into the house. Yet we remember that his new identity 
is but his illusion--he is driven away from the house like a 
baby. 
3. What has been said about Mrs. May can also be said 
of Mrs. Mcintyre of "The Displaced Person," and Mrs. Cope of 
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"A Circle in the Fire." Like Mrs. May, both are land owners 
who try in vain to maintain their crumbling identities. To 
avoid repetition, I am not discussing them here; they will 
be treated in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
LANGUAGE AS A GAME AND THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE WORD AND THE WORLD 
Towards the end of the story "A Later Encounter with 
the Enemy," General Sash, a one-hundred-year-old veteran of 
the civil War, finds himself attacked by the commencement 
speaker's words "that meant nothing to him": "He felt that 
. • . the words were coming at him like musket fire" that he 
could not escape (CW 260, 261). Finally, he is, in a way, 
killed by these empty words. Interestingly, Mrs. Shortley 
in "The Displaced Person" also imagines the conflict between 
her and Mr. Guizac, an immigrant, as "a war of words," and 
she sees "the Polish words and the English words coming at 
each other ... grappling with each other" (CW 300}. In 
her fiction, O'Connor touches repeatedly on the issue of 
"words," or, more accurately, "the war of words." She is, I 
deem, trying to demonstrate that people's excessive reliance 
on words has confined them within a verbal universe where 
words do, in fact, replace things and thoughts replace 
actions. In revealing how human beings are trapped in 
language, she, in turn, exhibits to us the difference 
between the word and the world that we tend to ignore. In 
this chapter, I will elaborate my argument by examining the 
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following stories: "A Good Man Is Hard to Find," "A Later 
Encounter with the Enemy," "The Displaced Person," "A Circle 
in the Fire," " A Stroke of Good Fortune," and "The Life You 
Save May Be Your Own." 
Language, again, is a system of difference that deals 
with relationship rather than absolute reality. In other 
words, language functions merely to help us constitute our 
own sense of reality. As Hawkes illustrates with regard to 
bourgeois discourse, "it [bourgeois discourse) shapes 
reality in its own image, acting as the institutionalized 
carrier, transmitter or encoder of the bourgeois way of 
life" (107). Any signifying structure, Hawkes further 
explains, is thus a system "which a society constructs in 
order to sustain and authenticate its sense of its own 
being: i.e, the very fabric of its system of 'meaning'" 
(131). Hence, there is no truly objective or one-to-one 
relationship between the word and the world. Instead, there 
is always a disparity between the two, forever urging us to 
narrow it and, simultaneously, forever thwarting our efforts 
to do so. As a result, people tend to work only with 
language while believing they are dealing with reality. 
To illustrate the point, let us first turn to "A Good 
Man Is Hard to Find." What the protagonist, the 
grandmother, says in the story has little to do with 
reality. Language is merely a word game she plays. At the 
beginning of the story, the grandmother, who wants to visit 
"her connections in east Tennessee" rather than go to 
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Florida (her son's intended destiny), never says a single 
word about her true intention but talks, among other things, 
about the dangers of meeting the Misfit en route to Florida 
so as to frighten the family into changing their minds (CW 
137). Later, to get the family to visit an old house on a 
remote farm, she even tells them of "a secret panel in the 
house," which, she knows, has never existed (CW 143). In 
addition, in order to prevent the Misfit from killing her 
family, she repeatedly calls him "a good man" when she knows 
him otherwise. Throughout the story, the grandmother 
develops, in Richard Pearce's words, "a language of cliches 
to disguise and control reality . " (79). To the 
grandmother, what count are words or other signifiers like 
dress and looks. Her notion of goodness or good men is 
based completely on conventional terms--the decorum that the 
South boasts of. 
When the family sets out on the road, the grandmother 
is dressed in sharp contrast to her daughter-in-law who 
"still had on slacks and still had her head tied up in a 
green kerchief": 
the grandmother had on a navy blue straw sailor 
hat with a bunch of white violets on the brim and 
a navy blue dress with a small white dot in the 
print. Her collars and cuffs were white organdy 
trimmed with lace and at her neckline she pinned a 
purple spray of cloth violets containing a sachet. 
(CW 138) 
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She puts on this fancy dress because she wants people to 
recognize that she is "a lady," not some unworthy woman. 
With this mentality, she collapses the gap between the 
signifier and the signified, equating appearance with 
reality. After only a casual talk, she calls Red Sam, a 
roadside cafe owner, "a good man." Like the grandmother, he 
also lives on words, and as soon as the family enters the 
cafe, Red Sam and the grandmother start a chat made up of 
platitudes: 
"These days you don't know who to trust," he said. 
"Ain't that the truth?" 
"People are certainly not nice like they used to 
be," said the grandmother. 
"Two fellers come in here last week," Red Sammy 
said, "driving a Chrysler. It was a [sic] old 
beat-up car but it was a good one and these boys 
looked all right to me. Said they worked at the 
mill and you know I let them fellers charge the 
gas they bought? Now why did I do that?" 
"Because you're a good man!" the grandmother 
said at once. 
"Yes'm, I suppose so," Red Sam said as if he 
were struck with this answer. (CW 141-42) 
The dialogue well exemplifies man's total reliance on words. 
On the one hand, the grandmother bases her judgment of Sam 
merely on the story he told her. Red Sam, on the other 
hand, makes his living, in part, by playing with language: 
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he talks to the grandmother obviously to win her, a 
customer's, trust so as to keep his business--his life-
line. The logic of his talk appears to further suggest that 
language is the same as the world, for it is the only thing 
by which we know people. Sam starts by saying that we do 
not know "who to trust," and that, according to him, is 
truth. But by telling the grandmother the wonderful things 
he said he did, he is implying, perhaps unconsciously, that 
the one way to know "who to trust" is listening to what 
people tell you. In the grandmother and Red Sam, we see 
clearly humanity as slaves/manipulators of words. 
The grandmother further exhibits her dependence on 
looks and words when she boast to the Misfit, "I know you're 
a good man at heart. I can just look at you and tell " (CW 
147; emphasis added). The grandmother's dependence on looks 
is too obvious to miss here, for the Misfit exhibits all the 
conventional decorum. With "silver-rimmed spectacles," he 
has "a scholarly look" {CW 146). He is extremely polite 
even when he asks the grandmother's son and his family to 
allow themselves to be shot: "Would you mind stepping back 
in them woods there with them?" And he even apologies for 
not wearing a shirt in front of the ladies {CW 148). Thus, 
"his actions," as Dorothy Tuck McFarland points out, 
"demonstrate a complete lack of essential connection between 
conventional behavior and some fundamental standard of good 
and evil that is assumed to lie behind it" (19). In this 
sense, the Misfit, I would argue, serves to satirize and 
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shock people who, like the grandmother, attempt to identify 
words with objective reality. 
O'Connor even has the Misfit indict our total 
dependence on words. The Misfit twice tells the grandmother 
that his conviction was not based on any specific evidence 
of his committing a crime but on "the papers" the authority 
had on him: "they could prove I had committed one (crime) 
because they had the papers on me" (CW 151) . To survive in 
such a system, the Misfit goes on to say, you have to "get 
you a signature and sign everything you do and keep a copy 
of it. Then you'll know what you done and you can hold up 
the crime to the punishment and see do they match and in the 
end you'll have something to prove you ain't been treated 
right" (CW 151). The Misfit's statement exposes our faith 
in signature/writing and our presumption that signature/ 
writing, as signifiers, can preserve the presence of the 
signified--events that took place in the past. But, as 
Derrida and other deconstructionists have convincingly 
demonstrated, the temporal and spatial gap inherent in the 
signifying system may never be bridged; the signifying 
structure always involves a trace from the signifier to the 
signified, a trace that seldom succeeds in locating the 
signified. 1 
What the Misfit says about our obsession with "papers" 
depicts our society, whose function depends totally on 
words--the word of religion or the word of the law--which 
are man-made systems that govern what we do. People 
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everywhere fill the world with cliches and platitudes. For 
example, when the Misfit is killing her family, the 
grandmother does nothing but urge the Misfit again and again 
to pray, claiming that if he prays, he will be saved. In 
this sense, argues Preston M. Browning, the Misfit "would 
seem to be a kind of saint manque, cutting through the 
cliche-ridden, heedless lives of the people he murders to 
radical questions of depth, of spirit, of the reality of 
good and evil as ontological entities" (58). But the irony 
is that, while the Misfit accuses others of using empty 
language, he does, too. As mentioned earlier, when he 
prepares to kill the grandmother's family, he politely 
"requests" them to follow him, and more important, he 
advocates signing whatever we do. He proves no exception to 
the human dependence on words. 
"A Late Encounter with the Enemy" provides, in a 
different way, another example of the human tendency to 
focus only on language--on the signifier--and to take it for 
whatever we would like it to be. In the story, Sally Poker 
Sash, a sixty-two-year old who is graduating from college 
after going to summer school for twenty six years, wants her 
one-hundred-year old grandfather to attend her graduation 
ceremony as a symbol of "what all was behind her" (CW 252). 
She makes him sit on the stage to stand "for the old 
tradition! Dignity! Honor! Courage!" (CW 253). But the 
old man is in fact a floating signifier that stands for 
nothing. Though known as General Tennessee Flintrock Sash, 
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he is in reality, as the narrator reveals, George Poker 
Sash, who had been only a major. He has no memory of what 
his granddaughter wants his to signify: "The past and the 
future were the same thing to him, one forgotten and the 
other not remembered" (CW 257). What the old man knows and 
enjoys are ironically "parades with Miss America and Miss 
Daytona Beaches and Miss Queen Cotton Products," products of 
commercialism (CW 252). 
Moreover, the old man is employed to represent 
something that perhaps has never existed. The South's so-
called "glory," "dignity," and "honor" are primarily a myth 
Southerners have invented. What Sally Poker Sash and the 
commencement speakers attempt by using the old man is to 
perpetuate the myth so as to maintain their own sense of 
being--their dreamed glory. The speaker associates the old 
man with "Chickamauga, Shiloh, Johnston, Lee," but these 
words mean "nothing to him [the old man]" (CW 260). What is 
going on is thus a word game to the old man, symbolized as a 
game of warfare: "the words," we are told, "were coming at 
him like musket fire" (CW 261). Being part of the game, 
General Sash himself becomes a "word" his granddaughter 
plays with, a word signifying, however, nothing. O'Connor 
makes the message extremely clear at the end of the story by 
having Sally Poker's Boy Scout nephew wheel about the 
general, who is now dead, bump him "at high speed down a 
flagstone path," and wait "with the corpse, in the long line 
at the Coca-Cola machine" (CW 261-62). With his corpse set 
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against the Cola machine, which enjoys great popularity, the 
old man's position as a floating signifier becomes extremely 
apparent: a body supposed to signify past ''glory" rests side 
by side with a symbol of a totally commercialized world. 
This denouement is of great significance because it suggests 
that the old man and the glorious history of the South he is 
meant to symbolize are not much different from coca-cola--
they are just two of the many products men have made. The 
story thus makes it clear that the enemy of the old man, and 
of mankind as a whole, is language--its often meaningless 
words. 
Like the grandmother, Sally Sash and the commencement 
speakers, Mrs. Mcintyre and Mrs. Shortley (Mcintyre's hired 
help) in "The Displaced Person'' also play with language to 
uphold their vision of reality. When Mr. Guizac, a Polish 
immigrant, comes to work for Mcintyre, he brings with him 
the qualities and values of advancing capitalism--industry, 
technical skills, and efficiency: 
Three weeks later Mr. Mcintyre and Mrs. Shortley 
drove to the cane bottom to see Mr. Guizac start 
to operate the silage cutter, a new machine that 
Mrs. Mcintyre had just bought because she said, 
for the first time, she had somebody who could 
operate it. Mr. Guizac could drive a tractor, use 
the rotary hay-baler, the silage cutter, the 
combine, the lets mill, or any other machine she 
had on the place. He was an expert mechanic, a 
carpenter, and a mason. He was thrifty and 
energetic. Mrs. Mcintyre said she figured he 
would save her twenty dollars a month on repair 
bills alone. She said getting him was the best 
day's work she had ever done in her life. (CW 
292) 
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Also, Mr. Guizac can get the barn cleaned by "only nine-
thirty," in contrast to Mr. Shortley who "had never got 
anything washed until eleven" (CW 310). Hence, before long, 
Guizac becomes a threat to the Shortleys. Facing this 
challenge, Mrs. Shortley, who used to think religious 
service merely "a social occasion providing the opportunity 
to sing" (CW 294), begins "to read her Bible with a new 
attention" (CW 300). She starts to despise the Poles for 
having a religion that "had not been reformed" (CW 296), and 
she talks about her sympathy "for niggers and poor folks," 
and even claims she has always had such concern for them (CW 
298). Moreover, she reads the Priest as the devil who 
brought Mr. Guizac, "the Whore of Babylon" (CW 301). But 
all her references to religion are merely a game of words 
she plays to defend her and her husband's shaky position 
against Guizac's invasion. 
That is why she images the battle between her (her 
family) and Guizac as a war of words: 
She began to imagine a war of words, to see the 
Polish words and the English words coming at 
each other, stalking forward, not sentences, just 
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words, gabble gabble gabble, flung out high and 
shrill and stalking forward and then grappling 
with each other. She saw the Polish words, dirty 
and all-knowing and unreformed, flinging mud on 
the clean English words until everything was 
equally dirty. (CW 300) 
In fact, words are her only means to fight back and defend 
herself. She knows that with the advancement of the Pole, 
her husband will soon lose his job. Yet she will not accept 
the fact. She defines displaced persons in literal terms: 
"It means they ain't where they were born at and there's 
nowhere for them to go • " (CW 290) . With this 
definition, she tries to deny the possibility of historical 
displacement, something her family is confronted with. But 
Guizac's industry and efficiency soon defeat her empty 
rhetoric: after overhearing that they are to be fired, she 
and her family immediately leave the farm (CW 302-3). 
Mrs. Mcintyre has her own linguistic reality or, in 
Spivey's words, her "artificial stasis," which O'Connor aims 
to deconstruct (208). At the top of Mrs. Mcintyre's world 
stand herself and the other "good whites;" below them are 
the "white trash" like the Shortleys'; at the bottom lie the 
"niggers." The arrival of the Guizacs does not seem, at the 
beginning, to threaten her world order; rather, it 
strengthens it by bringing to her farm efficiency and 
economy. During this period, she taps on capitalist 
discourse, talking to her farmhand mostly about money, the 
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need to work, and the law of survival. She tells her 
people, "Times are changing .... It's getting so full of 
people that only the smart thrifty energetic ones are going 
to survive" (CW 307). She explains to her black help why 
they have to work hard: 
"What you colored people don't realize," she 
said, "is I'm the one around her who holds all the 
strings together. If you don't work, I don't make 
any money and I can't pay you. You're all 
dependent on me but you each and every one act 
like the shoe is on the other foot." (CW 308) 
But when she later learns of Guizac's plan to bring over his 
cousin by marrying her to Sulk (a black farmhand), she is 
shocked, less, however, by the prospect of an interracial 
marriage than by the Pole's growing economic independence 
and potential to take over her place: "One night she dreamed 
that Mr. Guizac and his family were moving into her house 
and she was moving in with Mr. Shortley" [who has come back 
to her after his wife's death] (CW 322). 
After this, Mrs. Mcintyre switches her discourse, and 
starts to speak about Christian morality and patriotism. 
She accuses Guizac of being a bad Christian: "'I cannot 
understand how a man calls himself a Christian,' she said, 
'could bring a poor innocent girl over here and marry her to 
something like that" (CW 314). And when the priest asks her 
not to fire Guizac, she says: "'I don't have any obligation 
to him [Guizac]. My obligation is to the people who've done 
123 
something for this country, not to ones who've come over to 
take advantages of what they can get ... 11 (CW 320). Yet 
all these words, like those of Mrs. Shortley, are empty 
signifiers she plays with in order to dismiss the Pole. 
Though her word-game helps her ignore the facts, it fails to 
save her from displacement. She finally loses not only her 
farm but also her speech organ: "her eyesight grew steadily 
worse and she lost her voice altogether" (CW 326). 
Mrs. Cope of "A Circle in the Fire" poses as another 
Mrs. Mcintyre. Also a land owner, she treats her farm as if 
it were an Eden and herself its holy defender. She is seen 
again and again pulling weeds and grass around her house: 
"she worked at the weed and nut grass as if they were evil 
set directly to destroy the place" (CW 232). Acting as if 
she were God's envoy, Mrs. Cope constantly preaches to Mrs. 
Pritchard, wife of her hired farmhand, instructing her to be 
thankful for whatever she is given, fortune or adversity. 
"'We have a lot to be thankful,' she said. 'Every day you 
should say a prayer of thanksgiving'" (CW 234). But, as 
Browning suggests, Mrs. Cope is merely "paying lip service 
to some vague notion of divine providence, [and she] 
actually worships at the altar of her own resourcefulness" 
(51). The following example of Mrs. Cope's bragging best 
supports Browning's argument: "I have the best kept place in 
the country and do you know why? Because I work. I've had 
to work to save this place and work to keep it" (CW 235). 
When three poor boys come to her farm, Mrs. Cope decides to 
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play the same word-game to safeguard her kingdom. Although 
she does not want the boys to stay, she feigns a welcome: "· 
it's nice of you to stop and see me. I think that was 
real sweet of you" (CW 236) . Even when she forbids the boys 
to ride the horses, she claims that she does it for their 
good: "I am afraid you boys can't ride the horses because 
you might get hurt" {CW 237). But, despite her effort, Mrs. 
Cope fails in her true intention of making the boys leave. 
In return for her lip service to them, the boys set her 
woods on fire, destroying it. 
Just as word-play fails to help Mrs. Mcintyre and Mrs. 
Cope protect their respective farms, it fails to prevent 
Ruby Hill in "A Stroke of Good fortune" from losing her 
young womanhood. Having observed childbearing turn her 
mother into an old woman at the age of thirty-four, Ruby is 
determined to avoid pregnancy. When she becomes pregnant, 
she simply cannot accept the fact and tries to deny it by 
imaging otherwise. She flatters herself for being 
"extremely young looking for her age," and congratulates 
herself for doing "so much better (in keeping young] than 
her sisters" (CW 186-87). She vows to Laverne, her friend, 
that she will never see a doctor in her life, and she shows 
her stubborn determination by telling the latter, "They 
carried me once [to a doctor] when I was ten . . . but I got 
away. Three of them holding me didn't do no good" (CW 193). 
Using language, Ruby creates her own world and rationalizes 
her actions. In a sense, she lives on words. 
To her, words are not merely signifiers; they are 
entities, as is shown in her response to the pain in her 
stomach: 
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She had thought the word cancer once and dropped 
it instantly because no horror like that was 
coming to her because it couldn't. The word came 
back to her immediately with the pain but she 
slashed it in two with Madam Zoleeda [a palmist 
she once saw]. It will end in good fortune. She 
slashed it twice through and then again until 
there were only pieces of it that couldn't be 
recognized. (CW 190) 
Her imagined slashing of the word "cancer" clearly 
exemplifies her attempt to hypostatize language--to collapse 
the signifier into the signified, as Parker does in 
tattooing the picture of Christ. She simply wants to 
replace the world with the word. Yet, despite all her 
effort, the illusion she creates for herself with language 
finally evaporates towards the end of the story when she 
collapses on the stairs in great pain: 
She put her fingers on her stomach and pushed 
down and them took them off quickly. She began 
walking toward the stairs, slowly, as if the floor 
were going to move under her. She began the 
steps. The pain came back at once. It came back 
with the first step. "No," she whispered, "no." 
It was just a little feeling, just a little 
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feeling like a piece of her inside rolling over 
but it made her breath tighten in her throat. . . 
• On the sixth one (step], she sat down suddenly, 
her hand slipping weakly down the banister spoke 
onto the floor. . (CW 194-95) 
That language is a game Ruby and the other characters 
play can also be seen in the various dialogues she has with 
her neighbors. Take for example the conversation between 
her and Mr. Jerger: 
"Yeah, it's a nice day," she said languidly. 
"Do you know what great birthday this is?" he 
asked. 
"Abraham Lincoln," she muttered. 
"Hah! You are not trying," he said. "Try." 
"George Washington," she said, starting up the 
stairs. 
"Shame on you!" he cried ...• 
"Now examine this," he said. He was bending 
over a book, running his finger underlines: "'On 
Easter Sunday, April 3, 1516, he arrived on the 
tip of this continent.' Do you know who this he 
was?" he demanded. 
"Yeah, Christopher Columbus," Ruby said. 
"Ponce de Leon!" he screamed. "Ponce de Leon! 
You should know something about Florida," he said. 
"Your husband is from Florida." 
"Do you know who Ponce De Leon was?" 
"He was the founder of Florida," Ruby said 
brightly. 
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"He was a Spaniard," Mr. Jerger said. "Do you 
know what he was looking for?" 
"Florida," Ruby said. 
"Ponce de Leon was looking for the fountain of 
youth," Mr Jerger said, closing his eyes. (CW 
188-89} 
The two are not engaged in meaningful communication. What 
they are engaged in is a game or war of words. On the one 
hand, Jerger tries to belittle Ruby and to show off his 
knowledge of history (ironically, he does it only with the 
assistance of a history book} ; on the other hand, Ruby 
attempts to fend off Jerger's "attack" and display her 
wisdom, but she ends up only revealing at once her ignorance 
and pretentiousness, which is best shown in her saying that 
Ponce de Leon was the founder of Florida in answering the 
question intended to elicit Leon's nationality. 
"The Life You Save May Be Your Own" presents a more 
intriguing and dirtier war of words, one between Tom T. 
Shiftlet, a one-armed vagabond, and Mrs. Crater, an old 
widow. The story begins with Shiftlet arriving at Crater's 
house. Capable of all kinds of tricks, Shiftlet decides to 
do whatever he can to possess the old lady's car sitting in 
the shed at a corner of the courtyard; badly in need of 
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someone to "take care of" her severely retarded daughter, 
Mrs. Crater, on the other hand, schemes to make the tramp 
this desired caretaker. What follows is a heated war of 
words--a war of signifiers with no referents. On the one 
hand, the old lady deceives Shiftlet about the true nature 
and the age of her daughter: she claims that her daughter is 
"the sweetest girl in the wold. I wouldn't give her up for 
nothing on earth. She is smart too ... 11 (CW 176), and she 
also tells Shiftlet that the girl is "fifteen, sixteen" when 
in fact she "was nearly thirty" {CW 178). On the other 
hand, Shiftlet disguises his materialism by talking about a 
disinterest in material gains and a dedication to spiritual 
pursuit. Like Red Sam, the cafe owner in "A Good man is 
Hard to Find," Shiftlet starts his conversation by 
condemning the corruption of the world: "'Nothing is like it 
used to be, lady,' he said. 'The world is almost rotten'" 
(CW 173). When Mrs. Crater tells him that, if he works for 
her, she can provide him with food and board but she is not 
able to pay him, he answers, "Lady • there's some men 
that some things mean more to them than money," and he 
claims to be such a man, one who has "a moral intelligence" 
(CW 175, 176), though we know otherwise. 
Allowed to stay, he fixes the car and agrees to "marry" 
the girl, but not until he obtains the car, and seventeen 
dollars from the old woman (again, after a hard-fought war 
of words). He says that he needs the money for their 
"honeymoon," something he decides to do solely for the 
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girl's sake. Infuriated at Shiftlet for his greediness, 
Mrs. Crater accuses him of milking her; and mad at his 
ungratefulness, she blasts him: "Lemme tell you something: 
there ain't any place in the world for a poor disabled 
friendless drifting man." Against this barrage of words, 
Shiftlet, after some deliberation, fights back: "Lady, a man 
is divided into two parts, body and spirit .... The body, 
lady, is like a house: it don't go anywhere; but the spirit, 
is like a automobile: always on the move, always . • I'm 
only saying a man's spirit means more than anything else" 
(CW 179). Shiftlet's answer marks the climax of his war of 
words with Mrs Crater, but, despite its high-sounding 
spiritual and philosophical tone, it, I will argue, betrays 
him. 
In this speech, Shiftlet again follows his old game of 
pretending to be interested only in the spirit. Yet his 
"spirit" is no different from his "body": both are material, 
for, to him, as the body equals a house, the spirit equals 
an automobile (this reminds us of Haze whose "spirit" is 
also a car, his Essex). That the spirit is compared to an 
automobile is of great significance, because an automobile 
is a typical symbol of the material world, and, as we know, 
it is something Shiftlet secretly yearns for. It is no 
wonder that his "spirit" (an automobile) "means more than 
any thing else" to him. Even the old woman seems to see his 
true "spiritual" needs. In answering Shiftlet's above 
comment about duality, she says, "Listen •.. my well never 
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goes dry and my house is always warm • • . . And yonder 
under that shed is a fine automobile . You can have it 
painted by Saturday. I'll pay for the paint" (CW 179). By 
providing Shiftlet with a house and an automobile, Mrs. 
Crater meets literally the needs of both his body (house) 
and spirit (automobile). The word-play here reveals 
Shiftlet to be merely another "Hawkes" or 11 Shoats 11 --like 
them, he is a business man who exchanges "spirit" (religion) 
as a man-made product for other man-made products, such as 
money and automobiles. 
By handing her daughter, Lucynell, to Shiftlet and 
giving him her car, the expediently dishonest Mrs. Crater 
falls victim to Shiftlet's word-play. He weds her daughter 
and then deserts her on their way to honeymoon. Yet, after 
he has deserted Lucynell (leaving her in a road cafe), 
Shiftlet, driving alone by himself, becomes depressed. A 
linguistic creature who lives on words, he needs someone to 
talk to so as to maintain his created reality--to maintain 
his sense of himself as a successful man, able to attain 
whatever he desires. As a result, Shiftlet offers a ride to 
a young boy and boasts to him about his superiority and his 
"best old mother in the world" (CW 182). Unable to tolerate 
Shiftlet's braggadocio, the boy soon abandons him. Having 
gone from a deserter to a desertee, Shiftlet seems 
astounded, astounded because he is deprecated by the boy's 
words: "My old mother is a flea bag and yours is a stinking 
pole cat! 11 (CW 183). But he is not really shocked, as many 
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critics argue, by his own sin, and he is not about to change 
either, for, even after the incident, he is still talking 
only about the rottenness of the world, not his own 
rottenness. The rottenness, in his words, has not touched 
him: it is only "about to engulf him"; more important, he, 
again, uses words to raise himself above the rest of the 
world: "'Oh Lord," he prayed. 'Break forth and wash the 
slime from this earth!'" (CW 183). By this prayer, he tries 
to set himself apart from the slime: he becomes one who 
calls God to clean the world, a prophet. And he seems 
determined to continue the course he set earlier--to drive 
to Mobile after deserting Lucynell: "Very quickly he stepped 
on the gas and with his stump sticking out the window he 
raced the galloping shower into Mobile" (CW 183). With the 
story ending this way, we cannot help worrying about the 
future victims of Shiftlet's never ending word-game. And in 
Shiftlet's and Mrs. Crater's use of words as deception and 
self-deception, we see again the gulf between the word and 




1. A story that the grandmother tells her grandchildren 
on the trip may testify to this theory. When she was a 
young girl, the grandmother had a boy friend called Edgar 
Atkins Teagarden, who brought her a watermelon every 
Saturday with his initials "E.A.T 11 carved on it. One 
Saturday, when Teagarden brought the melon to her, there was 
no one at home, so he left it on the front porch. But she 
never got the melon "because a nigger boy ate it when he saw 
the initials, E.A.T.!" (CW 140). Some critics might 
dismiss the incident as a comic element in the story, but 
based on the fact that the issue of signification is so 
prominent in O'Connor's fiction, we can safely consider it 
another case showing the difficulty of closing the gulf 
between the signifier and the signified. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE VIOLENT BEAR IT AWAY: AN IMPOSSIBLE 
DISTINCTION AND A NEVER ENDING QUEST 
Published in 1960, The Violent Bear It Away, O'Connor's 
second novel and the only other one besides Wise Blood, 
marks, as many critics have pointed out, the apex of 
O'Connor's achievement in fiction writing. But the success 
of the novel lies not only in its poetic prose or well-knit 
plot--that is, the stylistic and technical merits that 
scholars have identified--but also in its thematic depth. 
All the issues treated in the rest of her work (issues that 
I have discussed in the previous chapters) are given 
expression here, and these issues are so well interwoven in 
the story that they give the book not only a complexity but 
also a continuity that we do not see in Wise Blood. 
Evolving around young Tarwater's search for meaning, the 
story is a stringent satire on, simultaneously, 
fundamentalism (embodied by old Tarwater), and scientism 
(advocated by Rayber), and on each man's obsessive yet 
futile attempt to distinguish himself from the other. 1 
Moreover, the satire here attains an unprecedented intensity 
because it results not just from the narration but also from 
the characters' comments upon each other. That is, in this 
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story, the major characters function as forces attacking 
each other's complacent beliefs. 
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To support my argument, I will first explore the satire 
on old Tarwater's religious fanaticism (a theme primarily 
found in the first part of the story starting with the old 
man's death and ending with young Tarwater's departure for 
the city), then discuss the attack on Rayber's obsession 
with scientism--a metamorphosed fundamentalist fanaticism--
(a major theme of the second part of the story covering 
young Tarwater's stay in the city with Rayber), and finally 
examine young Tarwater as a unique character who challenges 
both the old man and Rayber and who seems to embrace neither 
(an issue treated mostly in the last part of the story). 
While doing all this, I shall further demonstrate that 
truth/reality is fictional and our identity is but non-
identity, and expose again (mostly in the last part of the 
discussion) O'Connor's futile urge to assert her own 
truth/meaning, i.e., show how the story itself sometimes 
thwarts or deconstructs O'Connor's efforts to affirm her 
religious vision. 
The novel begins with the death of Old Tarwater, and 
the opening paragraph sets the satirical tone for the entire 
first part of the story: 
Francis Marion Tarwater's uncle had been dead 
for only half a day when the boy got too drunk to 
finish digging his grave and a Negro named Buford 
Munson, who had come to get a jug filled, had to 
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finish it and drag the body from the breakfast 
table where it was still sitting and bury it in a 
decent and Christian way, with the sign of its 
Savior at the head of the grave and enough dirt on 
top to keep the dogs from digging it up. (CW 331) 
Without any background information, we readers will find the 
situation not only pathetic but also ironic and comic: one 
of the old man's own kin becomes drunk only a few hours 
after his death, and a liquor client of his has to "drag" 
his body and bury it "with enough dirt on top to keep the 
dogs from digging it up." The irony becomes more apparent 
as we learn more, in the following few paragraphs, about the 
old man and his life. The old man had kidnapped young 
Tarwater from Rayber (his nephew and the boy's uncle) in 
order to raise him as a prophet like himself, and he had 
hoped that the boy would give him a Christian burial (with 
the sign of Christ on the head of his grave) after his 
death. All his efforts have obviously been in vain. Most 
ironical of all, it was the liquor the old man brewed that 
made the boy drunk. 
As we read on, the irony turns into a satire on old 
Tarwater. The old man, we are told, was a self-appointed 
prophet: "The old man, who said he was a prophet, had raised 
the boy to expect the Lord's call himself and to be prepared 
for the day he would hear it" (CW 332; emphasis added). And 
he taught young Tarwater that in this world it was "[either] 
Jesus or the devil" (CW 354). Moreover, old Tarwater was 
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such a fundamentalist that he desired literal fulfillment of 
his prophecies. After he prophesied a "destruction awaiting 
a world that had abandoned its Saviour"--a destruction he 
said would be realized when "the world would see the sun 
burst in blood and fire"--he waited for the sun to burst and 
was very disappointed when it failed to: "it [the sun) rose 
every morning, calm and contained in itself, as if not only 
the world but the Lord Himself had failed to hear the 
prophet's message •• he despaired of the Lord's 
listening" (CW 322). As a fanatic, the old man would not 
give up his desire, however. He envisioned the realization 
of his "prophecy": "Then one morning he saw to his joy a 
finger of fire coming out of it [the sun) and before he 
could turn, before he could shout, the finger had touched 
him," yet, ironically, as the narrator continues to tell us, 
"the destruction he had been waiting for had fallen in his 
own brain and his own body. His own blood had been burned 
dry and not the blood of the world" (CW 332). 
Fulfilling prophecies in such a manner--in one's own 
imagination--only exposes the old man's way of arriving at 
truth and his way of proving that the Lord has called him: 
self-confirming and self-calling. In this sense, Rayber is 
right when he asserts in his study of the old man that "He 
[the old man) needed the assurance of a call [from God) and 
so he called himself" (CW 341). Though Rayber himself, as I 
will show later, fails to escape this self-affirming 
practice in his "scientific study," his claim here certainly 
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pinpoints the old man's problem: substituting self-calling 
for God's call. That is why the old man was extremely angry 
at Rayber's claim: 
"Called myself!" the old man would hiss, "called 
myself!" This so enraged him that half the time he 
could do nothing but repeat it. "Called myself. I 
called myself. I, Mason Tarwater, called myself. 
11 {CW 341) 
In calling himself, the old man intended to become God 
Himself; at least, he acted as if he were the Saviour. He 
repeatedly claimed that it was his mission to "save," in 
succession, Rayber, young Tarwater, and Bishop (Rayber's 
mentally retarded son), and more important, he tried by 
every means to accomplish his design. He kidnapped both 
Rayber and Tarwater (when they were young boys) to have them 
baptized. Though unable to baptize Bishop--because "the 
schoolteacher was on his guard and the old man was too fat 
and stiff now to make an agile kidnapper" (CW 335)--he 
ordered young Tarwater to carry it out, claiming that it was 
God's call on the boy: "'if by the time I die,' he had said 
to Tarwater, 'I haven't got him baptized, it'll be up to 
you. It'll be the first mission the Lord sends you" {CW 
335). Yet, ironically again, all his fanatic efforts to 
"save" the boys turned out to be failures. Rayber left the 
old man after being kidnapped for four days and has become a 
school teacher, a non-believer interested only in statistics 
and psychology; Tarwater, despite the old man's inculcation, 
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remains a doubter who has never stopped questioning the old 
man's preaching. The baptisms that the old man performed on 
the two were thus empty signifiers, a fact that ridicules, 
in turn, the old man's obsession with religious rites. 
The biggest irony, however, is not his failed attempt 
to be the Saviour. Rather, it lies in the fact that, while 
the old man believes he is apart from the "real world," he 
lives in the very system he denounces as the world of the 
other, the world of urban people like Rayber. To separate 
himself from the "real world," he chose to live in 
Powderhead, a very reclusive place which he fashioned as 
Eden: "Powderhead was not simply off the dirt road but off 
the wagon track and footpath, and the nearest neighbors, 
colored not white, still had to walk through the woods, 
pushing plum branches out of their way to get to it" (CW 
336). To preserve the purity of the place, he would not 
even permit young Tarwater to go to school. He wanted to 
"guarantee the purity of his [the boy's] up-bringing, to 
preserve him from contamination, to preserve him as His 
elect [sic] servant, trained by a prophet for prophecy;" as 
a result, he lied about the boy's mental and physical 
conditions to the truant officer and persuaded the officer 
to let young Tarwater stay away from school (CW 340). The 
old man was so sure about his place being superior to the 
city that he would not allow the boy to go to Rayber's place 
even after his death: he told the boy, "And when I'm gone, 
you'll be better off in these woods by yourself with just as 
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much light as the sun wants to let in than you'll be in the 
city with him" (CW 344). 
Yet, despite his apparent distinction from the "real 
world," the old man was deeply involved in the system from 
which he tried to distinguish himself. For example, he made 
his living by making and selling liquor, something often 
considered as a corrupting product of the commercial world. 
The fact that O'Connor has the old man live by selling 
liquor--out of so many ways she could have him make his 
living--is very significant, because, to many people, 
religion and alcohol should never mix. Even the stranger 
(an invisible character) perceives the irony: 2 he questions 
young Tarwater about the inconsistency of the old man's 
practice: "A prophet with a still! He's the only prophet I 
ever heard of making liquor for a living" (CW 358). 
Furthermore, like the priests in Wise Blood and many other 
stories, the old man treats religious faith in material 
terms, using his property as a leverage to make people 
"believe." 
After Rayber became a teacher rather than a prophet, 
the old man went to the city "to call on the layers to try 
to get the property [Powderhead] unentailed so that it would 
skip the schoolteacher and to go to Tarwater" (CW 346). In 
preventing Rayber from inheriting the property and by 
passing it to young Tarwater, the old man hoped to punish 
Rayber, the nonbeliever, and to reward the boy who stayed 
with him. This action also reveals the old man's desire to 
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control the property even after his death, because, by 
passing the land to the boy, whom he considered a successor 
of himself, rather than to Rayber, a total "other," he felt 
sure that the property was still in "his" rather than the 
"other's" hand. Even young Tarwater seemed to question the 
old man's action. While seeing lawyers in the city, the 
place of "evil" (the old man had taught him again and again 
about the city being the devil's place), the boy was 
surprised to find himself "enjoying what should have 
repelled him" and to find the old man buried in his own 
business, showing no concern for his "spiritual soundness" 
as he used to. Hence, the boy yelled at the old man, "What 
kind of prophet are you? . . Call yourself a prophet!" 
(CW 346). The old man's answer "I'm here on bidnis" is, 
ironically, a very appropriate one, for the old man was on 
business in a double sense: he was doing business with the 
lawyers in order to penalize Rayber for being a non-
believer, so the trip to the city also involves "religious 
business." The old man's religious practices are thus not 
unlike those of Hawkes and Shoats, who make faith a product 
for sale, and his kingdom is not unrelated to the "real 
world." The two are in fact closely interwoven. 
Moreover, the old man's purpose in kidnapping and 
raising young Tarwater was not simply to "save" him as he 
openly claimed. Listen to the following speech he makes to 
the boy: 
"Listen," he said. "I never asked much of you. I 
141 
taken you and raised you and saved you from that 
ass in town and now all I'm asking in return is 
when I die to get me in the ground where the dead 
belong and set up a cross over me to show I'm 
there." (CW 338) 
Here, he betrays his true intention to make the boy his 
caretaker after his death. He further revealed his 
intention when he complimented himself for his life's 
success despite his failure to "convert" Rayber: he "lived 
on fourteen years [after leaving Rayber] and raised up a boy 
to bury him, suitable to his own taste" (CW 345). The old 
man's "spiritual endeavor" is thus always mingled with 
worldly pursuit. The narrator renders the point clear in a 
symbolic but also comic way when describing the old man's 
making and trying on of his own coffin. After finishing the 
coffin, he "had scratched on the lid, MASON TARWATER, WITH 
GOD, and had climbed into it where it stood on the back 
porch, and had lain there for some time, nothing showing but 
his stomach which rose over the top like over-leavened 
bread" (CW 337). A fundamentalist, the old man not only 
wanted a cross over his dead body but he also engraved the 
words "WITH GOD" on the lid of his coffin to show his faith, 
to show that he was concerned only about spirit. But, very 
ironically, when he is in the coffin, we see nothing of him 
but his "over-leavened" flesh: his flesh overwhelming his 
proclaimed spiritual superiority. This comic presentation 
of the old man destroys or, at least, calls into question 
the "true prophet" label that O'Connor and some critics 
intend to impose on him. 
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Having doubts about what the old man taught him, young 
Tarwater, after waking up from his drunken sleep, sets the 
place on fire and decides, against the old man's will, to go 
to the city (to Rayber) "to find out how much of it [the old 
man's teaching) is true" (CW 380). Completely destroying 
the kingdom/property the old man attempted so desperately to 
preserve, the boy's action highlights the failure of the old 
man's "spiritual"fmaterial designs, bringing the satire on 
him to a climax. As the story moves from Powderhead to the 
city, its focus shifts from the old man to Rayber, from a 
satire on the old man's frenetic fundamentalism to a censure 
of the school teacher's equally frenzied scientism--a 
metamorphosed fundamentalist fanaticism. On the surface, 
Rayber seems the opposite of old Tarwater. He is a 
"rationalist," believing in neither God nor anything else 
supernatural. But, in reality, he is, like the old man, a 
believer, a fanatic believer in modern science and 
technology, his displaced gods. He is so obsessed with 
modern psychology and statistics that he fails to realize 
what he believes in is merely another artificial system, 
another man-made text not truly different from religion. 
Rayber's total belief in and dependence on science and 
technology is very obvious, for he lives physically on 
artificial devices. When young Tarwater arrives at Rayber's 
house and sees him (it is also Rayber's first appearance in 
143 
the story), the boy is struck by the latter's dependence on 
machines: 
He [Rayber] came back [to the door] almost at 
once, plugging something into his ear. He had 
thrust on the black-rimmed glasses and he was 
sticking a metal box into the waist-band of his 
pajamas. This was joined by a cord to the plug in 
his ear. For an instant the boy had the thought 
that his head ran by electricity. (CW 386). 
Rayber's hearing aid is so conspicuous on his head that his 
"face might have been only an appendage to it [the machine]" 
(CW 395). So young Tarwater cannot help asking him, "Do you 
think in the box [the machine's metal box] ... or do you 
think in your head" (CW 396). Moreover, even Rayber's eyes 
look mechanical: "his eyes had a peculiar look--like 
something human trapped in a switch box" (CW 426). Rayber's 
dependence on science/technology is not, however, limited to 
physicality. He relies completely on psychological theories 
in dealing with people, including himself; his understanding 
of people comes purely from the tests he gives them (he is 
an expert in testing at the school). Testing has in fact 
become Rayber's gospel, and people are merely pieces of 
information, as the old man points out in warning young 
Tarwater not to live with the school teacher: he tells the 
boy if he lives with the teacher, he will be only "a piece 
of information inside his [Rayber's] head. If you were 
living with him, you'd be information right now ... " (CW 
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339). Rayber is so obsessed with testing that he not only 
gives the old man a full test in "studying" him but he also 
tries to conduct a series of tests on young Tarwater. 
Soon after young Tarwater comes to his house, Rayber 
decides to "save" the boy from the old man's insane 
influence, and he intends to do so by testing him: "Rayber 
had intended giving him the standard ones, intelligence and 
aptitude, and then going on to some he had perfected himself 
dealing with emotional factors. He had thought that in this 
way he could ferret to the center of the emotional 
infection" (CW 399) . Rayber is interested in testing 
because he believes that, by testing, he not only learns the 
truth about people but he can also make his professional 
decisions scientifically without involving his personal 
opinions (CW 402). Yet he is wrong. Any test, being man-
made, is not really objective; it always involves human 
subjectivity, for the test writer has to decide what to test 
and what not to. The process of writing a test is, thus, no 
different from the process men use to create their 
linguistic knowledge of the world--subjectively choosing 
what to encode and decode. Rayber's way of understanding 
people does not escape this subjectivity, despite his 
apparent strict scientific approach. 
A look at Rayber's view of Bishop will illustrate the 
point: 
His normal way of looking on Bishop was an A 
signifying the general hideousness of fate . 
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• The little boy was part of a simple equation 
that required no further solution, except at the 
moments when with little or no warning he would 
feel himself overwhelmed by the horrifying love. 
{CW 401) 
For all his use of scientific signs and terms like "x" and 
"equation", his notion of Bishop is merely his own reading 
of the boy, not a purely objective interpretation based on 
some truth or reality outside of his consciousness. since 
he thinks it unfair for him to have a retarded son, he 
considers Bishop a signifier of "the general hideousness of 
fate." Rayber does not like Bishop--he confesses to young 
Tarwater that he has once tried to drown the child (CW 435)-
-because, to him, a "scientist," the child, as McFarland 
points out, "embodies all that Rayber wants to resist--all 
that is irrational and inexplicable, and that cannot be used 
for some pragmatic purpose" (98). That is, to him, the 
child, like the old man, is a total "other." Thus what 
Rayber does in his study and analysis is, to use old 
Tarwater's words, simply to put people "in his head and 
grind [them]," treating them in a totally subjective manner 
as if they were merely "parts and numbers" (CW 379, 341). 
Rayber is so entrapped in his "scientific studies" that 
he becomes no less a fanatic than the old man in several 
ways. While the old man confined himself in a reclusive 
place and talked about nothing but prophecies, the school 
teacher lives, though in the city, a "rigid ascetic" life: 
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"He did not look at anything too long, he denied his senses 
unnecessary satisfactions. He slept in a narrow iron bed, 
worked sitting in a straight-backed chair, ate frugally, 
spoke little, and cultivated the dullest for friends" (CW 
402). Furthermore, like the old man, who is preoccupied 
with "rescuing" others from evil by baptism, Rayber is fully 
obsessed with "saving" people from insecurity or mental 
illness by using psychoanalysis. Besides trying to 
transform the old man, Rayber has attempted to "help" his 
sister and to "save" young Tarwater. However, his efforts, 
like the old man's, prove in vain. When the old man comes 
to live with Rayber for a short time trying to convert him, 
the school teacher does a thorough study of the old man in 
an attempt to "cure" his fanaticism. But, when Rayber 
finishes the study and shows it to the old man, the latter 
becomes so enraged that he kidnaps young Tarwater (who is 
then a baby): "The next morning when he [Rayber] went to the 
crib to give the baby his bottle, he found nothing in it but 
the blue magazine with the old man's message scrawled on the 
back of it: THE PROPHET I RAISE UP OUT OF THIS BOY WILL BURN 
YOUR EYES CLEAN" (CW 379). 
His effort to help his sister (young Tarwater's mother) 
fared no better. When he learned that his sister had become 
a prostitute like their mother, Rayber considered it the 
result of her lack of self-confidence and procured her a 
lover "because he thought it would contribute to her self-
confidence" (CW 366; emphasis original). Yet, to his 
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disappointment, his sister remained the same, and the only 
result from the love affair was the birth of young Tarwater. 
Rayber's total failure to "save" young Tarwater from the old 
man's influence, a major issue of the second part of the 
novel, further highlights the satire on the school teacher's 
preoccupation with scientism. In order to bring the boy 
back into the "real world," Rayber, besides trying to give 
the boy a series of tests, also takes him to visit the 
products of modern technology, believing these things will 
interest the boy enough to turn him around: "In four days 
they had been to the art gallery and the movies, they had 
toured department stores, ridden escalators, visited the 
supermarkets, inspected the water works ... 11 , and when the 
boy "had paused at a window where a small red car turned 
slowly on a revolving platform," Rayber, "seizing on the 
display of interest • . . had said that perhaps when he was 
sixteen, he could have a car of his own," but the boy was 
not impressed, for "he viewed everything with the same 
noncommittal eye as if he found nothing here worth holding 
his attention ... " (CW 398). 
Rayber will not give up, however. He later takes the 
boy to a "natural history museum," intending to "stretch the 
boy's mind" (CW 417). His decision betrays his logocentric 
belief in history as objective truth and knowledge, as 
something that should enlighten the mind. History, as we 
know, is not really a truthful record of what has happened; 
rather it is our interpretation, our encoding and decoding, 
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of the past, i.e., it is merely another man-made product. 
Hence, Rayber's design will not have any effect on the boy, 
who, in fact, does not even bother to go into the museum. 
The fact that the things Rayber uses to interest young 
Tarwater are not real/true as he deems them to be is 
symbolically shown in the bottle-opener he purchases for the 
boy as a present. The opener, as many critics have pointed 
out, is a very important symbol in the story: it symbolizes 
Rayber's scientism, as the country preacher's hat that the 
old man gave young Tarwater signifies the old man's 
fundamentalism, 3 though the two are not, as I would like to 
argue, really different in the final analysis. 
The implied association between the opener and Rayber's 
scientism is best manifested in young Tarwater's unusual 
admiration (though short-lived) for the instrument: the boy 
"pulled out the schoolteacher's present and began to admire 
it. • The little instrument glittered in the center of 
his palm as if it promised to open great things for him 
[He] held it there in his hand as if henceforth it would 
be his talisman" (CW 466-67). The boy seems to think that 
the wine of knowledge the instrument is symbolically 
supposed to open will lead him to some truth. But, 
ironically, the opener, the symbolic key to truth, had been 
bought in a shop noted for selling fake things and, more 
important, it was placed side by side with these fakes: when 
Rayber went into the shop to buy a present for the boy, 
"[h]is eye roved over a shelf of false hands, imitation buck 
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teeth, boxes of simulated dog dung to put on the rug, wooden 
plaques with cynical mottos burnt on them. Finally he saw a 
combination corkscrew-bottleopener that fit in the palm of 
the hand. He bought it and left" (CW 446). Symbolized by 
the opener that is associated with fakes, Rayber's scientism 
is thus exposed to be a purely man-made system like the old 
man's fundamentalism. The narrator stresses, again 
symbolically, the close relationship between Rayber's 
scientism and the old man's fundamentalism when she has the 
"stranger"--who gives young Tarwater a ride back to 
Powderhead at the end of the story and whom many consider 
the devil's agent--take from the boy both his country 
preacher's hat and the opener after he rapes the boy: "In 
about an hour, the stranger emerged alone and looked 
furtively about him. He was carrying the boy's hat for a 
souvenir and also the corkscrew-bottle opener" (CW 472). It 
is very ironic and significant that the symbols of both the 
old man and Rayber finally find the same possessor in the 
devil/stranger. 
Rayber is like the old man, also because he, too, wants 
to be a Saviour. For example, he tells young Tarwater, 
"'you need help. You need be saved right here now from the 
old man and everything he stands for. And I'm the one who 
can save you.' With his hat turned down all around he look 
like a fanatical country preacher" (CW 438). The last 
sentence in the passage also points to the similarity 
between Rayber and the old man, for the former is depicted 
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here exactly like the latter, "a fanatical country 
preacher." Rayber's purpose in "understanding" and 
"helping" others is, like that of the old man, to dominate 
them, a fact best shown in his struggle with the old man 
over the control of young Tarwater. Neither he nor the old 
man will allow the boy to have anything to do with the 
other. No sooner has the old man kidnapped the boy than 
Rayber goes to Powderhead to repossess him, and he gives up 
his effort only after the old man shoots and severely wounds 
him. 
After the old man's death, Rayber attempts desperately 
to reassert his control over young Tarwater. He tries to be 
the boy's father. For example, he tells the boy, "Listen, 
listen Frankie ... you're not alone any more. You have a 
friend. You have more than a friend. You have a father" 
(CW 396-97). And he treats the boy literally as his son: 
when they are registering at a hotel and the receptionist 
questions him whether young Tarwater is also his son (for 
the boy does not look like him), Rayber answers, "Certainly 
he's mine too (besides Bishop]," an answer that angers the 
boy, who, resenting his uncle's urge to possess him, tells 
the receptionist: "I ain't it [his son)" (CW 425). Rayber's 
urge to control others is so strong that he betrays his 
purpose of "understanding" when he tells young Tarwater, 
"What we understand, we can control" (CW 450). But, 
ironically, his scientific understanding produces no better 
results than the old man's preaching in helping him "save" 
others, showing his "understanding" of others to be no 
understanding, if not indeed misunderstanding. 
151 
Yet, as is the case with the old man, what is most 
ironic here is not Rayber's failure to "rescue" his 
relatives. It is his stubborn insistence on his distinction 
from the old man, while, as I have shown above, he is not 
very much different from the latter. His preoccupation with 
psychological "studies" is no less fanatical than the old 
man's obsession with "prophecies." His psycho analyses are, 
like the old man's close observation of sun when he waited 
for it to burst, subjective expectations and self-
projections rather than truth-finding. In their attempt to 
"save" others, both men are, to use Rayber's words about the 
old man, "self-called;" both are motivated by their urge for 
control and domination. Most important of all, while each 
insists in living in a different world, their worlds are the 
same world with two different faces. Listen to Rayber ask 
old Tarwater to come back to his "real world': "'You've got 
to be born again, Uncle,' he said, 'by your own efforts, 
back to the real world where there's no saviour but 
yourself'" (CW 379; emphasis added}. Here we can see 
Rayber's world is not really one without a saviour: rather, 
each person himself becomes the Saviour. 
In this sense, his world is not very different from the 
old man's where, as we have seen in the story, the saviour 
is not really God but individuals like the old man dressed 
as God. The two worlds are thus practically the same, with 
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men replacing God in each. Seen in this light, Rayber and 
the old man are doubles of each other: while both act as 
God, the former is a prophet of materialism and the latter a 
businessman of religion. Rayber's father's statement about 
himself being a "prophet of life insurance" ironically 
foregrounds the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon here: an 
insurance salesman, Rayber's father would not listen to old 
Tarwater's prophecies because "[h]e said he was a prophet 
too, a prophet of life insurance, for every right-thinking 
Christian, he said, knew that it was his Christian duty to 
protect his family and provide for them in the event of the 
unexpected" (CW 367). The label of prophet/salesman that 
Rayber's father gave himself depicts equally well both 
Rayber and old Tarwater despite their insistence on their 
distinct identities. 
The problem with many critics' (including O'Connor's) 
interpretations of the novel is that they tend only to 
contrast old Tarwater and Rayber, failing to treat the 
similarities between the two. As a result, they all end up 
privileging one (mostly the old man) at the expense of the 
other. The character young Tarwater seems to have escaped, 
at least in part of the story, such a trap. In all 
O'Connor's canon, Young Tarwater is a very unique character. 
In the story, he works as a agent challenging both the old 
man and Rayber, i.e., he embraces neither of the two sides. 
In spite of the old man's inculcation, the boy will not 
acknowledge Powderhead's absolute superiority to the city: 
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under the old man's pressure, he only says that "here 
(Powderhead] was less bad than there .... Less bad don't 
mean good" (CW 371). So, to the boy, both worlds are not 
"good" and need to be questioned. As the boy's challenge 
against Rayber is quite obvious and direct whereas his 
revolt against the old man is much more complex, I will only 
briefly exemplify his fight against Rayber and then explore 
in more detail his struggle with old Tarwater. 
Young Tarwater is very quick in pinning down Rayber's 
problem--preoccupation with science/technology. The minute 
he sights the school teacher, the boy notices the latter's 
total dependence on machines (the hearing-aid), and he also 
explicitly questions Rayber about whether he thinks in the 
box or in his head. The boy also fights Rayber by refusing 
to be tested, calling testing the school teacher's play. 
When Rayber tries to lure him into taking a test, the boy 
becomes infuriated: "'Play with it yourself,' he said. 'I 
ain't taking no test,' and he spit the word out as if it 
were not fit to pass his lips" (CW 400) . Young Tarwater is 
right in calling Rayber's testing his play, for, as pointed 
out earlier, testing is play, a kind of solitary-play: the 
tester interprets whatever he is "testing" in his own terms. 
The boy further denounces Rayber's scientism when he refuses 
the school teacher's offer to take him on a plane ride: he 
declares, "(seen from a plane] The houses weren't nothing 
but matchboxes and people were invisible--like germs. I 
wouldn't give you nothing for no airplane" (CW 438). Rayber 
wants to use a plane ride to attract the boy because 
airplanes are the hallmark of modern science/technology. 
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The boy's words of refusal are very appropriate and 
significant, for, in a symbolic way, they hit right on the 
problem of scientism, its dehumanizing nature: to Rayber and 
his like, people are like what they seem when seen from 
planes, insignificant "germs" or inanimate objects. Hence, 
the boy's attack on Rayber is forceful and to the point. 
Equally powerful is his challenge against the old man. 
The boy's revolt against the old man is first effectively 
shown in his setting fire to Powderhead and his leaving for 
the city against the old man's will. The boy also disputed 
the old man, as we learn from the flashbacks, by repeatedly 
questioning what the old man told and taught him. Several 
times, he contested the old man's claim about his knowing 
when God called him {CW 347, 371). Besides, when the old 
man had told the boy again and again about his efforts to 
save the school teacher, young Tarwater never fully believed 
his story. For example, the old man once said that he 
almost changed Rayber's mind by telling the latter that "I 
never come to live with you. I Come to die!" Hearing this, 
the boy rebutted the old man, "you had told him a bare-face 
lie. You never had no intention of dying" {CW 375). 
Despite the old man's repeated talk about his spiritual 
battle with Rayber, the boy did not think the two were 
significantly different and considered the conflict between 
the two merely the result of Rayber's insulting the old man 
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with the published study: "The boy would think: but if the 
schoolteacher hadn't written that piece on him, we might all 
three be living in town right now" {CW 378). More 
important, we remember the boy literally telling the old man 
that his place was not much different from Rayber's: "here 
was only less bad than there" and " Less bad don't mean 
good." Therefore, the boy would not follow the old man's 
call: when the old man "enjoined" the boy to baptize Bishop, 
the boy repeatedly refused: "He [God] don't mean for me to 
finish up your leavings. He has other things in mind for 
me" {CW 335); "I take my orders from the Lord ... Not from 
you'" {CW 379). In refusing the old man this way, young 
Tarwater not only reminds the old man that he is not God but 
also exposes the old man's attempt to replace God. 
Young Tarwater's refusal to baptize Bishop constitutes 
his major revolt against the old man. What makes the revolt 
a complicated issue is that the boy later drowns Bishop but 
claims that it is an accident even though he speaks the 
words of baptism while the child is being drowned {CW 458). 
Critics who follow O'Connor's interpretation of the story 
consider the boy's refusal as his attempt to escape God's 
call and his drowning of Bishop as evidence of his inability 
to flee from God. But such a reading is not without 
problems. First, to carry out the baptismal rite by 
drowning a mentally-retarded child is horrifying if not 
disgusting. Furthermore, Tarwater himself denies the 
drowning constitutes a baptism until the very end: "It was 
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an accident. I didn't mean to .... The worlds just come 
out of themselves but it don't mean nothing" (CW 458). Some 
people may argue that this denial best exemplifies the 
working of religious mysticism, of which O'Connor is an 
advocate. I admi~ that this can be a valid argument, yet if 
I am to accept this interpretation, I need to add that this 
incident intended to show the mystic power of God only 
serves as another example of O'Connor's use of mysticism to 
affirm her religious vision: by having young Tarwater 
mystically carry out the old man's order, O'Connor embraces 
the old man's fanaticism. 4 But such an embracing seems 
forced, a fact further demonstrated by the author's 
arrangement of the boy's final conversion or acceptance of 
his "religious mission" at the end of the story. 
Even after the boy has drowned Bishop and decided to 
return to Powderhead, he is still resistant to the old man's 
call: he tells himself, "It was not a boy he returned. He 
returned tried in the fire of his refusal, with all the old 
man's fancies burnt out of him, with all the old man's 
madness smothered for good, so that there was never any 
chance it would break out in him" (CW 465). The boy even 
begins "to realize that he had not adequately appreciated 
the schoolteacher while he had the opportunity" (CW 467). 
Yet, only few pages down, he is abruptly and entirely 
transformed: he sees himself, upon arriving at Powderhead, 
as "Moses glimpsing the promised land" (CW 474), and after 
setting fire again to the property, he marches back to the 
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"dark city, where children lay sleeping" (CW 479). People 
may defend this sudden change as a result of the boy's 
violent encounter with the devil/stranger, who drugged and 
then raped him. Yet this encounter itself appears clearly 
as an episode the author forced into the story in order to 
impose her religious vision. For example, the stranger is 
literally and heavy-handedly portrayed as the Devil, an act 
making the author's intention awkwardly obvious: the 
stranger is said to be "a pale, lean, old-looking young man 
with deep hollows under his cheekbones," and more important, 
after he raped the boy, "[h]is delicate skin had acquired a 
faint pink tint as if he had refreshed himself on blood" (CW 
469, 472). 
In fact, read closely, the denouement does not clearly 
suggest that young Tarwater fully embraces the old man and 
is ready to follow his call to be a prophet. We know that 
the boy sets on fire the place where the stranger had raped 
him, an act that, many critics argue, symbolizes the boy's 
annihilation of his past, a destruction of his connection 
with the devil. Yet the boy also sets Powderhead on fire 
before he finally leaves for the city. If the first burning 
constitutes the boy's attempt to destroy evil/the stranger, 
then the incineration (actually, it is the second time) of 
Powderhead might be his effort to eliminate the final trails 
of the old man's influence, for the place was the old man's 
Eden. And moreover, his decision to go to and stay in the 
city is something contrary to the old man's will. Seen in 
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this light, we are not sure that his marching to the city 
embodies his determination to carry out the old man's call. 
The last paragraph does not make it clear at all: 
By midnight he had left the road and the burning 
woods behind him and had come out on the highway 
once more .... Intermittently the boy's jagged 
shadow slanted across the road ahead of him as if 
it cleared a rough path to ward his goal. His 
singed eyes, black in their deep sockets, seemed 
already to envision the fate that awaited him but 
he moved steadily on, his face set toward the dark 
city, where the children of God lay sleeping. {CW 
478; emphasis added) 
What young Tarwater's envisioned fate is we do not know for 
sure, and the uncertainty is heightened by words like "as 
if" and "seem." 
The fact that these words of indeterminacy appear here 
is significant and revealing because O'Connor, after 
Caroline Gordon complained about "technical imperfections" 
in this novel, had exerted great efforts in eliminating 
phrases like "as if" and "seem" before she published the 
book: she once told a friend, "I have just corrected the 
page proofs and I spent a lot of time getting seems and as 
if constructions out of it." (qtd. in Edward Kessler 51). 
Yet, for the most part, O'Connor failed in her intent, for 
many "seems" and "as ifs" still remain (in fact, they abound 
not only in this story but also in the rest of her work). 
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She fails because the problem, I believe, is not merely a 
stylistic one. Kessler, for example, considers the problem 
the result of the difficulty O'Connor had in trying to 
express her religious belief in fiction: 
Editorial variants could hardly do more than 
disguise the difficulty the author (O'Connor] was 
having in bringing about the marriage of fiction 
and belief, of worldly analogy and that mysterious 
power that undermines the ultimate value of the 
here and now. (52) 
Conscious editorial efforts can neither bridge the gap nor 
eliminate the tension between fiction writing and belief, or 
in a larger sense, between language and meaning, because, on 
the one hand, we human beings have no control over language, 
and, on the other hand, as Freud repeatedly pointed out, 
what we suppress by conscious endeavor (editorial efforts 
included) will eventually resurface one way or another. 
O'Connor's failure to eliminate the "as if" and "seem" 
structures exemplifies this point. Perhaps, consciously, in 
order to assert her religious vision, O'Connor wants young 
Tarwater to follow the old man, but, unconsciously, she is 
probably not so sure. The one thing about which we are 
certain here is that the words "as if" and "seem" add to the 
uncertainty of the boy's future. So, maybe, as many 
believe, young Tarwater is to become a preacher like his 
grand-uncle. But, perhaps and hopefully, he is to remain a 
quester, continuing to challenge people's complacent 
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beliefs, whether it is fundamentalism, scientism, or any 
other "isms" that people like to take for granted. In so 
doing, he may, again hopefully, not be forced into the trap 
of privileging one systemjterm over another, a trap that 
seems impossible for human beings to avoid. Yet questing 
for the impossible is paradoxically human, and it is, hence, 
human for young Tarwater to carry on his never-ending 
possible/impossible endeavor, an effort that we hope might 




1. As is the case with some of O'Connor's other works, 
my interpretation of the novel differs from the author's. 
To O'Connor, the book stages no attack on old Tarwater who, 
she believes, is "a prophet in the true sense" (HB 407). In 
her response to some readers' criticism of the story, she 
labels the old man a preacher of "truth": 
People are depressed by the ending of The Violent 
Bear It Away because they think: poor Tarwater, 
his mind has been warped by that old man and he's 
off to make a fool or a martyr of himself. They 
forgot that the old man has taught him the truth 
and that now he's doing what is right, however, 
crazy. (HB 536) 
O'Connor opposes old Tarwater (as the force of good) against 
Rayber (as the force of evil) and sides firmly with the old 
man: in a conversation with Granville Hicks, she said, "Old 
Tarwater is the hero of The Violent Bear It Away, and I'm 
behind him 100 percent"(CFO 83). She also believes that we 
have to choose between the two: in an interview with Joel 
Wells about the novel, she said, 
I wanted to get across the fact that the great 
Uncle (Old Tarwater) is the Christian--a sort of 
crypto-catholic--and that the schoolteacher 
(Rayber) is the typical modern man. The boy 
(young Tarwater) has to choose which one, which 
way, he wants to follow. It's a matter of 
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vocation. (qtd. in Friedman and Lawson 258) 
So far, most critics have taken O'Connor's side, though a 
few (mostly the earlier readers of the novel) tend to 
embrace Rayber and denounce Old Tarwater. Though both sides 
make some legitimate points in their contentions, they make 
their arguments flawed by falling into the trap of 
privileging one and condemning the other. A close reading 
of the story will reveal that old Tarwater and Rayber, 
though appearing opposites to each other, do not differ very 
much, and the narration seems, for the most part, to favor 
neither of the two. The ambiguity of the story is so 
obvious that O'Connor herself admitted it in a letter to 
Robert Giroux, her publisher: "It appears to be a book which 
no two people have the same thing to say about" (HB 415). 
2. Some critics may question the soundness of quoting 
the stranger because many consider him the agent of the 
devil. But, evil as he is, his comments here are a valid 
challenging of the old man's practices, especially the old 
man's insistence on his distinction from the "real world.'' 
The stranger's comment also draws our attention, again, to 
what may be the inseparability of the religious and the 
commercial systems, a point I already explained in the Wise 
Blood chapter. 
3. That the hat is a symbol of the old man's influence 
is also suggested by Rayber's hatred of it: "He could not 
look at the object [the hat] without irritation. He wished 
to God there were some way to get it off him [the boy]" (CW 
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398) • 
4. As cited in the first note, O'Connor once stated 
that the boy had to choose between old Tarwater and Rayber, 
and she intended the boy to choose the old man who, in her 
words, "had taught him [the boy] truth." 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
By examining O'Connor and her work from a post-
structuralist perspective in this study, I have shown, 
first, how her fiction challenges people's logocentric 
beliefs and, then, how her writing sometimes lends itself to 
deconstruction. The logocentric beliefs that her work 
satirizes and attacks include the notion of absolute 
truth/reality, the belief in a transcendental meaning 
obtainable through the fusion of the signifier and the 
signified, the insistence on clear-cut identities, and, 
finally, the tendency to take language for reality. 
O'Connor's fiction has effectively exposed all these 
traditionally privileged beliefs to be merely the result of 
men's urge for power and control of both themselves and 
others. Yet, while decomposing these logocentric ideas 
manifested in her characters, O'Connor or her narrator 
sometimes lends herself readily to the same decomposition by 
affirming (often at the end of the stories) her religious 
vision as transcendental "truth." Most of the time, she has 
her protagonists renounce their own views of life and 
embrace her religious vision as ultimate reality, as the 
only life worth living. Mysticism is what she uses to 
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convey her "truth," for, frequently, the staunch unbelievers 
in her fiction are mysteriously converted by the "mystic" 
power of God. The implied message of these mystic 
conversions is that, though we cannot understand God/truth, 
truth still exists and we have to embrace it. O'Connor's 
mysticism, thus, serves the same function that her 
paradoxical/mystical textual movement does (as demonstrated 
in the first chapter): allowing her to have it both ways--
denouncing others for believing in their "truth" while 
claiming her own, the only, "truth." 
Yet, in so doing, O'Connor appears to be unaware of, 
or, probably, simply ignores the possibility that the 
religious system she affirms is but another man-made product 
not ve~y different from any other social or ideological 
systems people create and exploit for their own ends. The 
fact that many of her characters ( such as Hawkes and 
Shoats) exploit religion for material gain fully illustrates 
the similarities and the interwoven relationship between the 
religious and the commercial system. The fact that religion 
is indistinguishable from other "isms" and beliefs, in turn, 
exposes O'Connor's privileging of the former over the latter 
to be merely a drive for an impossible truth. This act of 
privileging one system over others has also been followed by 
those critics who emphasize O'Connor's mysticism. 1 Echoing 
O'Connor's claim of God being beyond human understanding, 
they, almost without exception, tap on this avowed mystic 
nature of the Divine to advocate O'Connor's religious 
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vision. For example, they hail Haze as O'Connor's 
"Christian malgre lui," they celebrate young Harry/Bevel's 
drowning as a sign of God's grace, and they salute old 
Tarwater for being a true prophet. 
But, as I have attempted to demonstrate, O'Connor's 
stories themselves often do not fully support such a clear-
cut reading; rather they generally discourage a reading that 
valorizes one side or certain textual evidence while 
suppressing the other. To avoid this "either/or" reading 
has been a major goal of my study, though I do not assume 
that I have fully escaped this trap. Nonetheless, I have, 
at least, given it a try, and that should suffice, for, to 
me, the effort is far more important than the end result. 
Before I lay my pen to rest, I feel I have to point out, at 
the risk of redundancy, that this study is solely an attempt 
to examine O'Connor from a new angle, and it does not claim 
to arrive at any truth about this great Southern writer, 
because truth lies beyond the approach this study employs. 
167 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Baumgaertner, Feeley, Gentry, 
Giannone, and Walters, all of whom have explored, in one way 
or another, how mysticism works in O'Connor's fiction. 
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